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I

PEASANT AGAINST LANDOWNER

The Peasant Revolt of 1907

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IN MARCH, 1907, the peasants in northern Moldavia, not far from the Russian frontier, arose in revolt.[1] Initially the uprising was directed, perhaps as a result of anti-Semitic instigation, against certain Jewish tenants renting large estates, but in its rapid extension south and west into Muntenia and along the Danube into Oltenia it became an increasingly violent assault upon all large tenant farmers and absentee landowners. The peasants not only demanded an amelioration of their labor contracts but in some districts seized land and organized revolutionary bands. The poorer peasants, those with insufficient holdings to support themselves, seem to have been the first to revolt, but they were soon joined by the more prosperous villagers. Indeed, subsequent investigations revealed that the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks, and schoolteachers.[2]

For a time neither the central authorities in Bucarest nor the local administrations were able to cope with the spreading unrest, but after the dismissal of the Conservatives a Liberal government, perhaps under the threat of foreign intervention by Austria, took vigorous countermeasures. Troops under General Averescu, later a war hero and political figure, descended on the countryside and after some sharp conflicts restored order. Reprisals in districts where there had been peasant violence were extremely severe. It has been estimated that upward of 11,000 peasants were killed in the course of the revolt and its suppression.

Although the uprising lasted less than a month and was completely subdued, it was, and was felt to be, an event of frightening significance. Here was no by-product of foreign invasion, the frequent

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1. For an account of the revolt see Radu Rosetti, *Pentru ce s'au răsculat ţăranii* (Bucarest, 1908). A recent novel by Leo Katz, *Seedtime* (New York, 1947), is based on this uprising. Many aspects of the revolt are obscure, and the dossiers relating to its suppression are reported to have disappeared subsequently from the Ministry of War. In 1948, however, under the auspices of the Groza government, Mihail Roller edited a collection of state documents regarding the 1907 uprising. This new material, which may contain important additional information, was not available when this chapter was written.

2. C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *Neoiobăgia* (Bucarest, 2d ed., n.d.), p. 204.

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occasion of many of Rumania's woes, nor a national revolt against an alien dominant class, but the unmistakable sign of a deep cleft within Rumanian society. The explosive culmination of a situation which had been building up during the preceding half-century, it rendered explicit and obvious the political dangers of the unresolved agrarian question. The outbreak had been foreshadowed by local uprisings in 1888, 1889, 1894, and 1900, and a few observers had predicted trouble. On the whole, however, an atmosphere of optimism and complacency had prevailed in the years following Rumania's emergence as a united and independent state. In 1906 the Minister of Domains had proudly declared in the Rumanian senate: "Gentlemen, you know that Rumania is one of the countries in Europe in which the small holding is more widespread than elsewhere, where the relation between the large and the small proprietor is more to the advantage of the latter than even in democratic France." [3]

The brief but intense convulsion of 1907, which in the eyes of terrified contemporaries had threatened Rumania's existence as a state and had nearly become a civil war, broke this complacency and gave rise to some soul searching. Politicians and writers ardently debated the causes of the revolt. Indeed, the stimulus of this unsettling event produced some of the most original social writings that have appeared in Rumania. For those who were unwilling or unable to see the full import of the uprising, it was most simply explained as the result either of "instigation" or of "peasant misery." The Conservatives accused the Liberal party of instigating the revolt to overthrow the Cantacuzino government. Despite the vagaries of Rumanian politics, it seems unlikely that the Liberals, many of whom were large landowners themselves, should wittingly have used such a dangerous device, although there is evidence of Liberal agitation directed against the Jewish *fermiers*.

The Liberals in turn charged that the revolt was the work of foreign revolutionaries: "The Rumanian authorities have discovered that the peasant uprisings are the fruits of a secret propaganda carried on among the peasants by a revolutionary group, in which teachers, priests, and Russian seamen of the cruiser "Potemkin" are taking part." [4] They expelled from the country some 880 persons, in-

3. Quoted in G. D. Creangă, *Grundbesitzverteilung und Bauernfrage in Rumänien*, 3 Teile, in *Staats- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschungen*, Hefte 129, 140 (Leipzig, 1907, 1909), I, 25.

4. Const. Titel Petrescu, *Socialismul în Romînia* (Bucarest, n.d.), p. 198. In 1908 the Russian cruiser "Potemkin," after the mutiny, eventually sailed to Constanţa, where the crew debarked as political refugees.

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cluding Christian Rakovsky, one of the leaders of the Rumanian socialist movement.

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Although signs of revolutionary activity and organization had been observed in certain districts, and some inflammatory pamphlets from Bessarabia had circulated in Rumania, the spontaneous spread of the revolt and the lack of evidence of careful preparation would argue against any important significance of such activity. The Rumanian socialists, who were in an extremely weak position, opposed the uprising. In 1892 the party program had declared that a backward country like Rumania was in no position to initiate a social revolution, and in 1907 the party advised the peasants against revolting: "Uprisings benefit only the boyars. The peasants afterward become even weaker and more depressed. . . . Peasants, you will not be delivered by uprisings, you will achieve profitable and lasting results not through violence and plundering but through seeking to destroy the political power of the boyars, landowners, and tenants." [5] In any event, the charge of instigation is a superficial one which, if sustained, explains the spark, not the conflagration.

Neither is peasant misery, while clearly a necessary ground for the revolt, a sufficient explanation. Extreme misery "dulls the mind, numbs the soul, destroys energy and the spirit of revolt, and leads to resignation and blind submission—a state of mind diametrically opposed to that which leads to revolt." [6] Moreover, the 1906 harvest had been exceptionally good. The important part played by village leaders and wealthy peasants would indicate that the revolt was more than a simple reaction to misery.

Certain contemporaries, notably G. D. Creangă, Radu Rosetti, Constantin Garoflid, and C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, made more penetrating analyses of the problem. Creangă, by his statistical studies of property holdings, provided concrete evidence of the high percentage of land occupied by great estates. Rosetti, after an extensive historical survey of the agrarian question, concluded that "the latifundia is the enemy," that the true instigators of the rising were not Liberals or foreign agents but the "egoism, greediness, lack of scruple and lack of foresight on the part of the ruling classes both old and new." [7] Garoflid, an agrarian expert and himself a landowner, held that the acknowledged maldistribution of land was a consequence of a basic crisis in the system of agricultural production. The socialist

5. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
6. Dobrogeanu-Gherea, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
7. Rosetti, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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175 ●568 Dobrogeanu-Gherea argued that a state of permanent crisis in Rumania was being effected by the impact of Western political and economic forms upon the traditional Rumanian pattern. The result was an unfortunate hybrid, *neoiobăgia* (neoserfdom), the form of liberal-bourgeois institutions superimposed upon a feudal reality. Although Dobrogeanu-Gherea placed excessive trust in neoiobăgia as an all-inclusive explanation, he correctly realized that Rumania's contact with the Western world had a dynamic and by no means simple effect upon the existing economic and social structure.[8]

Economic and Social Roots of the Agrarian Problem[9]

311 An extreme concentration of land in large estates, an excessive fragmentation of small holdings, and the insignificance of medium-sized properties were the most obvious elements of the Rumanian agrarian problem at that time. In 1905 the disparity between large and small holdings probably exceeded that of any state in Europe, including Russia. On the basis of his investigations, which are probably the most accurate available, G. D. Creangă estimated that Rumanian properties were divided in the following manner: in the terminology of the time, small properties (0–10 hectares), comprising over 95 per cent of all properties, covered 40 per cent of the arable and grazing land; medium properties (10–100 hectares), comprising 4 per cent of all properties, occupied 11 per cent; whereas about 5,000 large and latifundiary estates held nearly 50 per cent.[10] If forests, orchards, and vineyards are included, the area covered by large property exceeded 57 per cent. These figures on property do not, of course, include the landless peasants. Creangă estimated that there were at that time about 300,000 peasants without land and

8. For a further analysis of Dobrogeanu-Gherea's ideas in connection with Rumanian Social Democracy, see below, pp. 276–280.

9. More extensive, and in some respects conflicting, discussions of the economic background of the agrarian problem are given in David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Economic and Social History of the World War" (London; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930), and Marcel Emerit, *Les Paysans Roumains depuis le traité d'Andrinople jusqu'à la libération des terres (1829–1864)* (Paris, 1937).

10. In numbers the division was as follows:

Size of holdings in hectares	*Number of holdings*	*Area in hectares*
0–10	920,939	3,158,645
10–100	39,723	982,200
Over 100	5,385	3,810,351
	965,047	7,926,796

For more detailed figures on the distribution of property see the Appendix.

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of property relations followed a different course from that in the West, and in both countries contact with the West created a steadily increasing crisis which the legislative measures of the nineteenth century did not solve and in some respects exacerbated. In neither case did peasant emancipation lead to the healthy development of small holds but rather to the appearance of the land-hungry cultivator still in a position of dependence on the landowner.[26]

While there were these similarities in Russian and Rumanian social and economic life, and more than a casual parallel in the development of agrarian relations, the political and international positions of the two states were entirely different. This difference explains in part some of the very great divergences in the recent history of these countries.

Political Aspects of the Agrarian Question

Although Rumanian economic and social relations were such as to create a dangerous tension in the countryside, politically, in marked contrast to tsarist Russia, there was relatively little revolutionary activity. This difference has often been attributed to the lethargy and supineness of the Rumanian peasant or to his Daco-Roman stability and love of order and hard work. National qualities may have played some part, though the violence of the 1907 revolt was damaging to many such theories. A more substantial reason would appear to lie in the contrast between the political and international situations of the two states.

Russia, a great empire, was assured of its independence as a nation. Existing institutions were firmly fixed. Russian social reformers could direct their energies toward internal issues without being preoccupied with the question of national survival. For these reasons the climate was favorable to a revolutionary spirit. Quite opposite conditions obtained in Rumania, a newly created state whose position in the community, or anarchy, of nations was by no means secure. Many Rumanians were not as yet included within the country's

26. The sensitivity in Rumania to developments in Russia would suggest the presence of common characteristics. The Russian emancipation of 1861 was followed by Prince Cuza's Act of 1864. There is evidence that the Rumanian rising of 1889 was aroused by a rumor that the tsar had ordered land to be divided among the peasants. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found a reflection in the 1907 revolt in Rumania, and of course the Russian Revolution of 1917 had a direct bearing upon the Rumanian agrarian reforms of 1918–21. The correlation of these events is certainly more than a chronological coincidence. It might be added that Stolypin's program to reform Russian agriculture by creating a class of strong peasant holdings resembles some of the recommendations put forward by the Conservative agrarian expert Constantin Garoffid.

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boundaries. Consequently, national aims and ambitions tended to receive first attention from all articulate Rumanians.

Whatever may be the answer to the much debated question of Rumanian origins, the two principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, did not make their appearance until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. After a couple of centuries of precarious independence they fell under the domination of the Ottoman Empire. For a time native princes maintained some degree of internal authority; later Phanariot Greeks became the *hospodars* of the principalities; but the two provinces were not united until 1862, and the remnants of Turkish suzerainty were not shaken off until the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. While the Rumanians did contribute to achieving their national independence, the rise of a united Rumania was largely conditioned by events beyond their control: the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the repulse of Russia in the Crimean War, and the equilibrium established by the Concert of Europe at the Congress of Berlin. Rumania's independence and existence as a national state were thus externally determined, at least in the negative sense of permitting the Rumanians to enjoy some freedom of action in the nineteenth century.

The national progress of Rumania did not correspond with the social or material progress of the peasantry. On the contrary, the high points in Rumanian history from the national point of view often marked a decline in the peasant's status. The process of social differentiation which followed the foundation of the principalities seems to have led to a further subjugation of the peasant to the boyar. Under Michael the Brave, who for a short period ruled over all Rumanian lands, the peasants were definitely bound to the land. The Organic Statutes represented an advance constitutionally but also granted full proprietorship to the boyars and rendered the peasants' tenure even more precarious. To be sure, such a process is not unusual; in a society which is becoming more articulated the emerging ruling elements, which from a national aspect represent an advance by strengthening and organizing the state, may achieve their position at the expense of the more amorphous body of that society.

Because of the weakness and precarious position of the Rumanian state, preoccupation with national prestige outweighed and often ran counter to concern for social reform. In the abortive revolution of 1848 the young revolutionaries, educated in France, were undoubtedly fired by ideals of freedom and the rights of man, but more from desire to create in Rumania a proper modern state than from direct interest in the sufferings of the peasant. The manifestoes issued by the Muntenian revolutionaries promised land but at the same time,

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423 permitting the sale of small property, on certain conditions and after five years. Article 122, however, limited purchases to 25 hectares in the hills and 100 hectares in the plains.[11]

423 185 In general, the 1921 law was more carefully drafted than that of 1918 and did attempt to remedy some of the technical errors of previous legislation. The economic effects of these land reforms, which together were reported officially to have expropriated nearly 2,800,000 hectares of land in the Old Kingdom, will be discussed in a later chapter.[12] The acts of 1918 and 1921 were, however, essentially defensive political rather than economic measures. As Mihalache said in his critique of the decree-law of 1918,

> it is not the work of a social concept, not the response to a social ideal, not the work of conviction; under the threat of the events of 1917, it is the continuation of a series of land settlements on the model of 1881 and 1889, it is the over-simplified concept that a new equilibrium between large property and small property must be stabilized in order that there be future peace.

In his opinion, "The ruling class has made only such concessions as were necessary to assure its own existence. The reforms have been a kind of safety valve." [13]

The safety valve, however, was successful. Despite its very precarious position, Rumania passed through the revolutionary storm in eastern Europe without an overthrow of the established order. Several reasons explain this success. A decisive factor, doubtless, was the flexibility of the ruling groups. Notwithstanding the obduracy of many members of the landed oligarchy and in spite of efforts to avoid or delay the reform, the landowners did at least yield sufficiently to prevent an outbreak. Their recalcitrance between 1917 and 1921 was in inverse ratio to the amount of peasant unrest. Moreover, the king, although conservative socially, was able to take the correct 423 steps at two critical moments, in April, 1917, and in November, 1918. 186

Apart from the flexibility of the landowners, certain other forces 606 were at work. Among the Conservatives, the stronghold of the landed interests, there were such men as Garoflid who recognized the failings of Rumanian agriculture and desired to make thorough-going changes, though along lines different from those followed. In the

11. For subsequent modifications, in 1925 and 1929, of these provisions for sale, see below, p. 125 and pp. 156–157.

12. The difficult task of discovering just what the land reforms accomplished in redistributing property is discussed below, pp. 48–49, and in the Appendix.

13. Mihalache, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 28.

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Liberal party, the primary interest was in the expansion of industry, commerce, and finance, and since 1918 the party had officially stood for expropriation. In several respects the Liberal position was unfortunate since it had neither the reforming zeal of the new Peasant party nor the Conservatives' interest in the improvement of agriculture. The Liberals tended to regard land as a bone to be thrown to the peasants when the howls of the latter seemed menacing or detrimental to the national interest. Such a view was apt to neglect the economic aspects of the agrarian problem and to reduce it to a question of finding more land for distribution. Nevertheless, this Liberal attitude did make for change. Finally, once the question of land reform became the order of the day, the mere pressure of politics led the parties, if only for electoral reasons, to make the appearance of favoring reform.

A second factor was that the land laws, despite delays and omissions, were sufficiently extensive to pacify the peasants. A great deal of land changed hands, and the Rumanian reform was the most far-reaching of all the postwar agrarian measures in eastern Europe (excluding Russia, of course).

A third factor was concern for the national interest, which, as noted above, has usually been of primary importance in determining Rumanian internal policy. Notwithstanding military defeats, enormous human losses, and devastation of land, Rumania emerged from the war a victorious power with doubled population and territory.[14] The mere fact of being victorious and having achieved the national aim of Greater Rumania undoubtedly served to mitigate social tensions. The parties were in agreement in glorifying and protecting the new national unity; since Rumania was surrounded by states from which it had obtained territory, the defense of the new frontiers was a major concern of all postarmistice governments.

The very violence of the Russian Revolution, particularly the Bolshevik Revolution, served to create an opposing reaction in Rumania, heightened by the territorial dispute over Bessarabia. The political parties, including the Peasant party, were exceedingly hostile to bolshevism, which became the ultimate term of abuse in political debates. Mihalache had been sent to Bessarabia during the war to carry on antibolshevist propaganda, and one of his appeals for a more extensive land reform was that in the future the peasants should not be tempted to look beyond Rumania's frontier on the Dniester for better conditions. Fear of Soviet communism was one of the cardinal fea-

14. The area of Rumania in 1913 was 137,900 square kilometers; in 1919, 294,000 square kilometers. Its population in 1913 was 7,625,000; in 1919, 15,500,000.

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tures of Rumanian policy for the next twenty-five years, and in the international councils Rumania was to stress its role as the European bulwark against bolshevism.[15]

Agrarian Reform in the New Territories

Thus far only the agrarian reform in the Old Kingdom has been considered, and it does provide the central thread of the agrarian question in the interwar period. But as a result of the war Rumania also acquired Bessarabia from Russia, Bucovina from Austria, and Transylvania from Hungary. The agrarian problems in these three provinces were different in several respects from that of the Old Kingdom; the separate laws passed for each of the provinces further increased the complexity of the Rumanian agrarian situation after the First World War.

1. BESSARABIA

Bessarabia, which had formed a part of the principality of Moldavia, was ceded by the Turks to Russia in 1812 at the Treaty of Bucarest, in return for the evacuation of the remainder of Moldavia and Wallachia.[16] Three southern districts were returned to Moldavia after the Crimean War, but reverted to Russia after the War of 1877. The population was predominantly Rumanian, though large numbers of Ukrainians and Bulgarians inhabited the southern districts. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the tsarist regime undertook to Russify Bessarabia but without marked success. The Moldavian boyars in Bessarabia were notoriously obscurantist, and the province was a "natural breeding ground of such movements as the Black Hundreds." [17]

15. F. Borkenau, in his study, *The Communist International* (London, 1938), p. 99, attaches great importance to the Rumanian agrarian reform in this connection: "The agrarian reform in Rumania was perhaps the strongest single obstacle that opposed the advance of Bolshevism towards the West. It was very far from solving all problems, even for the peasantry, but for a decade it took the sharp edge off them. Revolutionary trends among the proletariat remained, but the proletariat alone was nothing in Rumania, and revolutionism among its members was more of a convulsion than a clearly defined movement."

16. The current Soviet interpretation of this event appears to be that in the eighteenth century the Moldavian and Wallachian boyars had sought the incorporation of the principalities in Russia as the sole means of escaping the Turkish yoke. This act of liberation was taking place during the Turko-Russian war of 1806. The threat of Napoleon, however, forced Tsar Alexander to come to terms with the Turks, so that only Bessarabia was fortunate enough to be liberated and incorporated in the tsarist empire. See A. Dolnik, *Bessarabiya pod vlastyu Rumynskikh boyar, 1918–1940 gg.* (Moscow, 1945), p. 5.

17. R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 568.

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In July, 1924, by order of the Commander of the Second Army Corps, the Communist party in Rumania and its associated organizations were dissolved for having violated state of siege regulations and for endangering the security of the state.

Bessarabia naturally suffered badly in the conflict; reports of foreign observers in these years present a desolate picture of rotting commerce, depressed agriculture, miserable administration and widespread fear and disaffection. The province had been continuously under martial law since 1919. The Rumanians reported frequent Soviet raids, plots, and instigations to violence; the Russians reported brutally suppressed peasant uprisings. Both were taking place. In the notable rising at Tatar Bunar in 1924, which involved a whole village, there is ample evidence of Communist agitation, yet an entire community does not participate in a revolt without serious occasion.

Tension was not limited to Bessarabia; in December, 1924, some 400 persons described as Communist terrorists were arrested throughout Rumania. In September, 1925, 28 members of committees of "red" unions were arrested in Bucarest. Disturbances, however, were not solely the result of Left-wing activity. Several anti-Semitic outbreaks occurred, with the usual attacks on synagogues and Jewish shops. On October 27, 1924, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, later the leader of the Iron Guard movement, achieved his first prominence by shooting the chief of police of Iaşi; he was subsequently acquitted.[17]

Under these circumstances, in which opposition to the government could so convincingly be depicted as anti-Rumanian, the Liberals, self-appointed guardians of Rumanian patriotism, were somewhat strengthened, whereas the Peasants were continually forced to protest their loyalty and to defend themselves against the charge of bolshevism.

At the beginning of 1926, however, the opposition to the Liberals became more intense. The announcement on December 28, 1925, of Prince Carol's renunciation of his right to the crown in favor of his infant son Michael [18] brought protests from the Transylvanian Nationalists and the Peasants. While expressing their continued loyalty to King Ferdinand, they refrained from voting on the bill of renunciation on the grounds that they had not been consulted on the appointment of the regency which was to govern during Michael's minority. It was widely known that Brătianu and Carol had not got

17. For the origins of the Iron Guard movement see below, pp. 226–228.

18. Carol had gone abroad with Mme Lupescu. Upon King Ferdinand's demand that he return, without her, Carol refused and renounced his right to the throne.

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665 175 tiations,[3] and was replaced by Maniu, with Titulescu as Foreign Minister. On January 8, 1933, Maniu again broke with Carol, and on January 14 Vaida Voevod returned to head the government.[4]

By this time the National Peasants were badly disorganized. With Carol's assistance a definite split in the party leadership between Maniu and Vaida Voevod was developing and was to lead to a rupture in 1934. The government itself had not only lost its peasant enthusiasm but under Vaida Voevod's leadership was rapidly drifting into the political habits of the Liberals. On the first of February 668 oil workers at Ploeşti struck over a wage decision, and a fight ensued between strikers and troops. At the same time in Bucarest some 665 175 7,000 workers in the state railway shops went on strike. The government hastily proclaimed martial law in Bucarest, Cernăuţi, Galaţi, Iaşi, Timişoara, Ploeşti, and the oil fields. The Communist party and its affiliates were again dissolved, the government passed laws against antisocial and antistate organizations, and over 200 Communists were arrested throughout Rumania. This brought a protest demonstration from the railway workers, troops were called out, and there was a vicious street fight.

To some extent this tension was a fatal by-product of the deepening depression, and the strikes, while obviously having their roots in the misery of the Rumanian industrial workers, were not confined solely to economic demands. Indeed, since the installation of the Groza regime, the Communists have played up the revolutionary elements of the railway strike and the guiding role of the Communist party in it. Even so, the government all too hastily resorted to the 175 very measures for which it had so long taken the Liberals to task. 665

Moreover, while Vaida Voevod was thus combating labor unrest,

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3. Rumania and Soviet Russia had not resumed diplomatic relations since the First World War because of their inability to reach any agreement on Bessarabia. In January, 1932, the Poles, with French urging, had signed a treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the U.S.S.R. Now Poland and France were pressing Rumania to do the same. Vaida Voevod, apparently without consulting Titulescu, had instructed the Rumanian representative in Warsaw to negotiate with Litvinov. Titulescu had heard of his move and had objected to the manner in which the negotiations were being conducted and especially to the possibility that Bessarabia might be recognized as a subject of dispute. In this disagreement Titulescu was sufficiently influential to squeeze out Vaida Voevod.

4. In this instance the specific difficulty arose over the dismissal of Colonel Marinescu, Prefect of Bucarest. Carol had been installing military officers in a number of civil posts. The National Peasant government undertook to replace them by civilians. Colonel Marinescu, in a circular letter, denied rumors that he was about to be removed and said that since he was appointed by the king, only the king could remove him. Mihalache, Minister of the Interior, then demanded his resignation, and failing to obtain it resigned himself. Maniu supported Mihalache and the cabinet resigned.

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appears to have been the consequence of personal differences but presaged a shift in Rumania's international orientation. As Rumania had been one of the principal gainers in the First World War, all the governments up to this time had a similar foreign policy, pro-French and against any treaty revision, which indeed was the only way Rumania could preserve its new territories from Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet claims. When it became clear that the Western powers had lost the initiative, foreign policy became less simple. The extreme Right was vociferously pro-German. Carol personally would have preferred to stay clear of German influence, since only the Western attachment gave promise of guaranteeing all the territories acquired by the war. But if Britain and France weakened, he was inclined to improve his relations with Germany. Rumania's relations with the U.S.S.R. had improved somewhat in the 1930's, but it was a negative improvement—a hope of assurance against Soviet attack. The underlying hostility between the two powers was deep and so pervasive as scarcely to require any discussion. Thus in 1937 Carol stated to Wickham Steed that the chief difficulty of Rumania's position lay in the fact that "the immense weight of Russia was always bearing upon her and she had to withstand it as best she could. Russia was, so to speak, the hereditary enemy. As regards Hitler, he felt admiration for Hitler, whom he did not look upon as a sinister or dangerous man." [7]

From 1936 on, as a consequence of this shift in the international balance, the extreme Right became more and more blatant; anti-Semitic activities increased in extent and vileness; university students showed the advantages of their education by attacking Jewish shops; hostility and scorn for the decadent democracies became the vogue; defections from the old parties decreased their strength and added to the forces of the Right.

During this time the National Peasant party, as the principal nonfascist opposition to the government showed little strength or determination. Mihalache did attempt to reinvigorate the peasantist element in the party's ideology and formed a "peasant guard" to protect National Peasant meetings from fascist bullies. In May, 1936, there was a demonstration of some 80,000 peasants in Bucarest, directed against the Liberals, demanding better conditions for peasants and workers and decrying the tolerance shown to the fascists. These efforts, however, had no significant results.[8]

7. Quoted in Pavel Pavel, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

8. According to Pătrășcanu (*Sous trois dictatures*, p. 114), the National Peasants had planned a large demonstration in November, 1935, but had canceled it upon Carol's promise that the Liberal government was about to fall and that they would succeed it.

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XI

THE FASCIST PERIOD, 1940–44

Rumanian Fascism

THE term fascist period, here used to cover the years of the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships is not altogether satisfactory except in the general sense of describing a dictatorial regime in military alliance with Hitler Germany. The government of Marshal Antonescu, especially after his victory over the Iron Guard in January, 1941, was really a military dictatorship, in many respects like the numerous other military dictatorships in Balkan history, although it took over many of the trappings and practices of fascism. The word fascism itself has been given any number of meanings and nuances. To some it is the death rattle of monopoly capitalism; to others, anti-Semitism and racial glorification; to others, a form of national chauvinism; and to others merely a synonym for dictatorship plus hooliganism. It would be fruitless here to attempt an exact definition of fascism, especially for Rumania where, at one time or another, practically every party has had the word "fascist" hyphenated to it by its opponents.

For all the vagueness of the term there was in Rumania a political current, appearing in a relatively unadulterated form in the Iron Guard and as a more or less important element in other political formations, which is quite recognizable and for which fascism is as good a name as any. Perhaps it can best be approached negatively, for ultimately it was a negative spirit. In the preceding sections the effort has been made to extract the positive content of several political currents and to examine their significance in terms of the problems of Rumanian society. It has been seen that the agrarian question was a perennial and chronic affliction deeply rooted in Rumanian society and to a very considerable extent the product of Rumania's contacts with Western industrial society. Along with the various attempts to find a positive solution—however inadequate or misdirected they may have been—there was also an impulse to a negative response. Indeed it is possible to say that fascism represents an irrational reaction against an unsolved problem in the body politic or, more precisely, in the context of an industrial or industrializing

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● 668 economy. It is something like a cancerous growth in an organism which arises from some chronic irritation, takes on a life of its own, displays great dynamism for a time, and ultimately is destructive of the body which produced it. If such an analogy be fair, it is necessary not to confuse an analysis of the unsolved problem with a justification of the fascist response, or to regard fascism as an inexplicable evil possessing the body of an innocent.

In its resort to the nonrational, fascism makes an appeal to the spontaneous, the organic, the primitive, and the mythical, to the instinctive rather than the logical aspects of human and social experience. From these it gains its emotional force and appeal. At the same time, the appeal to the natural and the traditional is itself an artificial and somewhat self-conscious act; the effort to reinvoke the spontaneous is itself not a wholly spontaneous act. Thus, fascism does not originate in the lowest and most backward strata of society but is usually in its initial stages an intellectual movement. In its origins at least it is not the creation of a nation or a social group which is at the bottom of the heap, but rather appears among those nations, social groups, or individuals which have advanced to the extent of being aware of their position and at the same time of being resentful and frustrated.

563 668 Conditions favorable to the various manifestations of fascism were certainly not lacking in Rumania. The struggle to achieve an independent national existence, the prolonged insecurity as a small state, the effort not only to escape the shadow of the great powers but to maintain a position in the scrambling of the Balkan states—all these led to an intense political nationalism which easily boiled over into chauvinism. The ethnic confusion of southeastern Europe and especially Rumania's sense of isolation in the "great sea of Slavs" produced a strong ethnic nationalism. Anti-Semitism had been endemic in Rumania since its appearance as an independent state; the Congress of Berlin had obliged the new Rumanian government to amend the constitution to grant Jews citizenship. The Jewish problem in Rumania was not a simple one. Especially in Moldavia there had been a rapid influx of Jews, largely from Russian Poland, in the nineteenth century; the population of the urban centers was largely Jewish; most of the commercial activities were carried on by the Jews. This situation, combined with Rumanian nationalism and the desire for self-assertion, produced the perfect atmosphere for anti-Semitism. The national literary movement at the end of the nineteenth century had a strong anti-Semitic tone. Professor Cuza, the Rumanians liked

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to say, was preaching the gospel of anti-Semitism while Hitler was still an infant.

But if nationalism and anti-Semitism are the constant handmaids of fascism, they do not wholly describe it. The element in fascism giving it its significance to the twentieth century is its response to the challenge of industrialism. It is for this reason that of the various political currents of pre-1914 Rumania populism had the closest affinity to some of the later manifestations of Rumanian fascism.[1] The populist response to this challenge, for all the specific rational arguments it may have advanced regarding the economic advantages of peasant farming, was fundamentally negative in its idealization of the unspoiled peasant and in its hostility to industry and the capitalist Golgotha. To these it added a strong cultural nationalism, a tendency to anti-Semitism, and that special characteristic of later fascism, a hatred of Marxism. To be sure, fascism is not generally anti-industrial. The tensions of contemporary industrial society impinge in different ways on different countries. But in the case of Rumania, with its particular position vis-à-vis industrial society, the fascist response in its most characteristic form involved this negation and an exaltation of the peasant.

During the interwar period Rumanian fascism developed in two phases. A number of fascist groups appeared immediately after the First World War, principally among students and the military, as a part of the general social turmoil brought about by the war. At that time fascism developed its leadership but did not become a mass movement. A second phase appeared with the depression; fascism broadened its influence and in the course of the 1930's increasingly dominated the political horizon. It took innumerable forms in Rumania: as an element in a larger political party, as a conscious imitation of foreign fascism, or as an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. In the first case, various manifestations of fascism, such as extreme chauvinism or anti-Semitism, appeared as a tendency in one of the established parties and often led to a schism. The defections of Octavian Goga and later of Vaida Voevod from the National Peasants may be taken as examples. In those cases where it took the form of an imitation of foreign fascism it was merely following the Rumanian practice of borrowing from the more developed European states.

An interesting example of borrowed fascism was the short-lived Fascia Națională Română, which began as a student organization

1. See above, p. 147.

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in Bucarest in 1923 and was later absorbed by Cuza's League of Christian Defense. This movement, which was never of any importance, was explicitly modeled on Italian fascism.[2] Its program had all the formulae of early fascism, but smelled of the candle and was a rather unimaginative academic exercise. A rabid anti-Semitism was the core of the program, which included detailed plans of the best ways to rid Rumania of the Jews. The Fascia was to be highly nationalistic, anticapitalist, antisocialist, anti-Communist, and antiparliamentarian.

But after a parade of these sentiments, with appropriate quotations from Mussolini, Barrès, and Maurras, and the promise of a two-year dictatorship to eradicate rotten politicians, the actual economic program was reminiscent of populism. Rumania should be an exclusively agricultural country; industrial states were less happy and had social upheavals. Agrarian reform should limit property to 100 hectares and land should belong only to those who cultivated it. Proposed agricultural improvements included the familiar clichés, model farms, cooperation, more machinery, more fertilizer, and better seed. Industry should not be protected; cottage crafts should be fostered. The commercial policy was quite simple: no imports without twice as many exports; this it was felt would assure a safe balance of trade. The program was clearly intended to appeal to peasants, workmen, and, above all, to the army, but in general it gives the impression of being the outpouring of a rather vicious schoolboy, which in all probability it was.[3]

Of far greater importance than this jejune attempt at fascism was the Iron Guard, or, more properly, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, which, while it had a number of similar traits and copied certain Italian and German features, was an authentic Rumanian fascist movement. Its founder Corneliu Zelea Codreanu was born in Iaşi in 1899.[4] Physically he was extremely impressive, tall, very handsome, with powerful and compelling features. He had received a good deal of military training in his youth and had absorbed the nationalist doctrines of Cuza and Iorga. In the spring of 1919 he began his career

2. Titus P. Vifor, *Doctrina fascismului romîn, şi antiproiectul de program* (Bucarest, 1924).

3. The only really original proposal was that the clubhouses of the disbanded political parties should be converted into state-supervised brothels.

4. There was a great controversy whether Codreanu was really a Rumanian or not. His opponents pointed out that his mother was of German origin and his father had changed his name from Zelinski to Zelea in 1902. Codreanu's supporters maintained that the name Zelinski had been forced upon his forebears because they had lived in southern Galicia under the Austrians, and pointed out that both sides of the family had belonged to the Orthodox Church, a sign of their Rumanian nationality.

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by organizing a group of companions in the Moldavian border town of Huşi to fight the Communists. In the same year he entered the law faculty at the University of Iaşi, where his principal activity was fomenting student riots against Jews and Communists. Codreanu was not of peasant origin; his father was a teacher, an active politician, and colleague of Professor Cuza. Codreanu not only studied at Iaşi but in 1922 attended lectures at the University of Berlin and later studied law at Grenoble.

In 1923 Professor Cuza founded his anti-Semitic party, the League of National Christian Defense; Codreanu became one of the party organizers. He was soon imprisoned for preparing a list of prominent politicians and Jewish leaders to be liquidated. While in prison he conceived the idea of the Legion of the Archangel Michael, taking the name from a statue of the saint in the prison chapel at Văcăreşti. Initially the Legion was a youth movement attached to the League of Christian Defense. Codreanu first gained national recognition in October, 1924, when he shot the police chief of Iaşi who had tried to break up his anti-Semitic activities. He was acquitted in a much-publicized trial which only augmented his popularity in anti-Semitic circles.

After 1924 Codreanu broke with Cuza. He always recognized his debt to the older man's teachings but felt that Cuza was tied to parliamentary politics and failed to see the need of a more dynamic policy. After a stay in France he founded, in 1927, an independent Legion of the Archangel Michael. In 1930 he created the Iron Guard as a combat unit to fight communism. In effect it was identical with the Legion, although intended to be its military branch and to include other groups desiring to enter the crusade.

When Vaida Voevod was Minister of the Interior in the National Peasant government he gave Codreanu a measure of unofficial support and even granted him permission to take a column of Guardists across the Prut to preach the archangelic gospel in darkest Bessarabia.[8] Mihalache, who replaced Vaida Voevod in 1930, took a sterner attitude and on January 11, 1931, attempted to dissolve the Legion and the Iron Guard. By this time the movement was gaining a strong mass following. In August, 1931, Codreanu won a seat in the chamber. The Liberal leader Duca again dissolved the Guard in 1933, for which he was assassinated, with Codreanu's knowledge and approval. In November, 1934, the movement assumed a new label, the All for the Fatherland party (Totul pentru Ţara), under the nominal leadership of General Cantacuzino. The Legion continued to grow in

8. Klaus Charle, *Die eiserne Garde* (Berlin; Vienna, 1939), p. 33.

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668 strength and by the time of the 1937 elections it appeared to be the outstanding force in Rumanian politics.

With Carol's sudden counterattack in 1938 it collapsed in surprising fashion. On February 21, 1938, Codreanu disbanded the movement to avoid, he said, unnecessary loss of blood. This may have been a purely tactical retreat, but it was certainly an anticlimax to the blood and thunder of Legionary oratory. The following day he sent a letter to all the old ministers who participated in Carol's coup, protesting against the dictatorship, which he saw as a dead form, and complaining that the older generation had betrayed its own ideals of legality. In the spring he was arrested, on a charge of libel against Iorga, condemned, and imprisoned. In November, 1938, he was shot by the Siguranța "while attempting to escape."

What was the Legionary movement? In some respects it was a copy of Italian fascism and German national-socialism, with its colored shirts, Roman salutes, paramilitary formations, and cult of a leader—*Capitanul*. Its anticommunism, anti-Semitism, and antiparliamentarianism, however, were home-grown. Codreanu used to say that he had adopted these principles before he had ever heard of Hitler, and that indeed when he had been in Berlin in 1922 he was able to show the light to several Germans who later became prominent Nazis. Codreanu's anti-Semitism had something of the frenzied quality one finds in the authentic Nazi—he professed to be physically stricken at the sight of Jews. His anticommunism was in part a corollary to his anti-Semitism, in that he considered communism a vehicle of international Jewish machinations.

The anticommunism of the Legion cannot, however, be explained wholly in terms of anti-Semitism. To some extent at least it was a reaction against what might be called the outrageous logicality of Marxism. Like fascism, Marxism was a response to the tensions of contemporary society but in its critique it attacked not only bourgeois society but also all the popular coexisting romantic and traditional attachments: its internationalism outraged national sensibilities; its dialectical materialism robbed the world of its myths and its homely beliefs. Fascism was based precisely upon these nonrational but deep sentiments. Hence, despite their mutual assault upon bourgeois society and their similarity in tactics there was a mortal enmity between the two movements.

In these qualities, however, the Iron Guard was merely the Rumanian manifestation of a European phenomenon. It had, in addition, certain more specifically Rumanian features. While the Nazis

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and the Italian Fascists were not on good terms with the churches, the Legion of the Archangel Michael was avowedly an Orthodox Christian movement and was fully aware of its distinctiveness in this respect. Guardist meetings were preceded by a religious service. The employment of religious symbolism and mysticism was not merely a tactical device of the Legion but was an integral part of its ideology. This religious element was undoubtedly of importance in the diffusion and quality of the Iron Guard's influence in Rumania, especially among the peasantry.

A second quality of the Guard was its cult of the primitive; not, however, the German primitivism of an ancient golden age in the *Urwald* but the primitivism of contemporary Rumanian peasant life. Reacting against the frustrations and anomalies of Rumanian society the Guard invoked the unspoiled soul of the peasant, sometimes even to the extent of glorifying his illiteracy. Such a reaction is not difficult to understand. Anyone who has visited Bucarest and seen the pseudo-French culture of the wealthy, the overeager imitations in art, architecture, and thought, and then contrasted them with the attractive side of Rumanian peasant life, the strange but moving music, the magnificent taste and sensibility of peasant handwork and folk ballads, is strongly tempted to condemn the former and wish wistfully that something authentic and real could develop from this peasant culture. At best there is something touching in this attempt to restore a national integrity permitting the flowering of native potentialities in place of a bastard culture, derivative, and without life of its own.[6]

Unfortunately this problem cannot be solved by simply eradicating foreign influences and reverting to the simplicity of the peasant: "Those who have a Fall behind them can never become innocent again."[7] Rumanian folk culture, if left to itself for an indefinite period of time, might have evolved its own advanced cultural forms but it was not. The Rumanian peasant today adds a sheet iron roof to his picturesque hut, tops his traditional costume with a battered felt hat, and pins up a cheap photograph with his icons and wood

6. In this connection it is of interest to note that in his analysis of the 1937 elections, C. Enescu observed that the purely anti-Semitic vote (i.e., in the districts with a large Jewish population) tended to go to the Cuza-Goga party rather than to the Iron Guard, which seemed to gain its votes from a more general dissatisfaction with the whole of Rumanian public life. *Sociologie Romaneasca*, 2, Nos. 11–12 (November-December, 1937), p. 828.

7. Alfred Weber, *Farewell to European History*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, 1947), p. 198.

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● 648 carvings without the slightest feeling of incongruity. An attempt to take away the sheet iron, the manufactured hat, the photograph, and all which they imply would be a retrograde step.

A third, and less attractive, characteristic of the Legionary movement was a marked morbidity and cult of death. To some extent this derived from the Christian belief that death must precede resurrection. It was also an aspect of the idea of sacrifice and self-abnegation to be found in other fascist movements. It stimulated the "heroic assassination" and the "death squads" and contributed to the series of political murders which convulsed the 1930's.

According to the Legionary code the unit was not the individual but the "nest," a collectivity that included not only living Legionaries but ancestors and those yet unborn. This spirit led to the Legionary practice of continually exhuming and exalting dead comrades. The code included also the less distinctive commandments of loyalty, comradeship, obedience, discipline, work, and honor.

Such were the emotional drives of the Iron Guard. It is not surprising that the program of such a movement should have been vague. In fact, the Legion was against programs. "The country is going to ruin," said Codreanu, "not for lack of programs but for lack of men." [8] All the old parties had a superfluity of programs which had achieved nothing. Before a program could be meaningful, it was necessary to develop the new man, free from the corruption of the past. "Today the Rumanian people do not need a great politician, as is erroneously believed. The Rumanian people today need a great teacher and leader, who will overcome the powers of darkness and destroy the brood of Hell." [9] In their slogans the Legionaries used such phrases as *Omul şi pogonul* (the man and the pogon) and *Hectarul şi sufletul* (the hectare and the soul) but these should be understood not as an agrarian program but rather as a symbol of the peasant's deep ties with mother earth.

In 1937 Codreanu did create the Battalion of Legionary Commerce, the purpose of which was to replace the Jews in trade and to prove that Rumanians, too, could be good merchants. Restaurants and shops were set up which were to be the core of a new economic spirit. In Italy, fascism had formed an alliance with corporatism, and in Rumania a similar mingling took place in some of the fascist currents. But it is interesting to note that Codreanu did not take up corporatism. In spite of the fact that Manoilescu was a good friend of the Legion and had been elected to the senate on its list, his efforts

8. Codreanu, *Eiserne Garde* (Berlin, 1939), p. 272.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 273.

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to incorporate his economic doctrines had little effect. Moţa, one of Codreanu's lieutenants and theoretician for the movement—his initial scholarly contribution had been the translation of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion into Rumanian—had written that corporatism was "entirely colorless from a folk point of view." [10] Corporatism should not come before the basic reform, the creation of the new man, since it would only solidify the existing corruptions in society. It should come afterward if at all.

This distrust of corporatism is not without importance, for it reinforces the supposition that in the 1930's the corporatist current, which so characterizes the latter half of Carol's reign, was in its origins quite different from Guardist fascism, although both were antiparliamentary and in many cases made political alliances. Corporatism was a consequence of an economic outlook, the Guard was an emotional and evangelical reaction against the existing order.

In its initial stages the Iron Guard found its principal support in student circles and in discontented elements on the fringes of society. In the 1930's it became a mass movement, as is shown—in rough approximation at least—by comparing its popular vote of 30,783 (1.2 per cent) in 1931 with the 478,378 (16.5 per cent) votes it received in 1937.[11] It obtained a following in the peasantry and in urban middle class and working circles. Its most active members were the social misfits, unemployed intellectuals, dismissed civil servants, a number of the members of the old boyar families, plus an assortment of plain toughs and hooligans. The Communists, in attempting to relate this movement to the class struggle, have held that the active support for the Iron Guard came from the interstitial groups, the declassés—the broken aristocracy, the petty bourgeoisie, and the *Lumpenproletariat*.[12] While it is not to be denied that the Iron Guard would have a special appeal to the dispossessed and uprooted, the terms "petty bourgeois" and Lumpenproletariat are notoriously evasive and too easily become catchalls for phenomena not fitting into the Marxist scheme. A somewhat simpler approach would be to see Rumanian society as a whole suffering from general dislocation and the fascist current as a reaction to that dislocation, taking on greater intensity in those parts of society most seriously affected. This would accou[illegible]

10. Charle, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

11. In the same interval Cuza's League, initially the larger, rose only from 118,863 to 291,107, an accurate reflection of greater effectiveness of the Iron Guard's dynamism.

12. Cf. Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază ale Romîniei* (3d ed., Bucarest, 1946), pp. 259–262. While his argument contains a good deal of truth it suffers from the necessity he feels to prove that the proletariat proper and the peasantry proper could not be activists in a fascist movement.

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● 648 for the peculiar venom of the declassés as contrasted with the less fanatical support of the impoverished which arose more specifically from the depression.

It is difficult to obtain reliable evidence concerning the calculated support given to the Iron Guard by interested groups, but there are numerous indications that government ministers in the 1930's, such as Vaida Voevod and Tătărescu, did support the Legion unofficially and did not greatly hamper its activities. Undoubtedly in the vast underworld of Rumanian police life, Siguranța officials found it a useful organization for combating Left-wing labor movements. Perhaps one should not place too great stress upon such Machiavellian motives. It is tempting to see in ministers, police chiefs, and mysterious financial interests absolutely cold and calculating individuals who were not in the slightest affected by the atmosphere of their surroundings. But after all both Vaida Voevod and Duca had said that apart from the battle against communism they had hoped to harness what they felt was constructive in the Iron Guard and divert it to less violent activities. It would seem reasonable to assume that they, too, were moved by some of the same sentiments which impelled the Guardists.

648 668 As to foreign support, there is no question that Hitler regarded Codreanu as his ally, and for good reason. In November, 1937, for example, Codreanu made his celebrated electoral declaration that he was against the Western democracies, against the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, against the League of Nations, against bolshevism, and in favor of the Rome-Berlin Axis: "Forty-eight hours after our victory we shall have an alliance with Germany and Italy." There is also evidence that in later years, at least, the Germans gave financial support to the Iron Guard, although some of the proofs produced by the Carol dictatorship are suspect. It would be wrong to conclude, however, that the Iron Guard was nothing more than a German fifth column. It was a very significant aspect of Rumanian social and political life.

Rumanian writers of various political beliefs have sought, understandably enough, to prove—by calling the Legion a tool either of the Germans, or of intriguing police chiefs and politicians, or of a class—that it did not represent the Rumanian people. Granted that the Rumanian people are not by nature fascist beasts, nevertheless the Iron Guard cannot be written off as a superficial phenomenon. In its way it was the nemesis of all the false constitutionalism and pseudo-democracy which have been observed in the course of recent Rumanian history.

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Yet the Iron Guard collapsed, not without some horrible spasms and death throes, but collapsed whenever a strong hand was raised against it. When Carol attacked it in 1938, despite the lash-back in the assassination of Calinescu, he had it under control. In 1940 he was overthrown by it only because his regime had been completely discredited. In January, 1941, the Guard was to show its ineffectiveness against Antonescu's army.

This strange weakness lay not in the fact that the Iron Guard was an artificial body, completely unrepresentative, but because it was all too indigenous. Its effectiveness seemed to be inversely related to its nearness to power. In opposition and under Carolist persecution, it seemed powerful and menacing; martyrdom became it well. When it came close to power it showed itself inept and maladroit. In the face of real problems, whether of government or of maintaining power, its aura vanished and its new men proved to be nothing but pillagers and thugs with no idea how to master a country, much less run it. The very negativeness of the Iron Guard, which gives it its particular interest, was its own undoing.

The Dictatorships

The Iron Guard enjoyed a brief period of triumph from September, 1940, to January, 1941, during which time it shared power with Gen. Ion Antonescu in a "National-Legionary State." Carol fell because the Germans lacked confidence in him but also because all political groups, including the National Peasants and the old Liberals, detested his regime which had discarded political freedom for the presumed interests of the nation and then had failed to make a move in its defense. At the last hour he had summoned Antonescu, a talented and forceful officer, but a man whose stern ambition both Carol and the Guardists failed to appreciate. After Carol's abdication and Michael's accession to the throne, Maniu and Constantin Brătianu supported Antonescu in the hope and on the condition that he would reestablish a constitutional regime. Such a hope had no chance of realization. Although Antonescu had been known as pro-French in the 1930's, he had by this time made his peace with Hitler and was thoroughly committed to a pro-Nazi policy.[13] He had long been criti-

13. It is evident, however, from the recently published memoirs of the former chief interpreter in the German Foreign Office that Antonescu's attitude was not one of obsequious servility. He vehemently criticized the Vienna Award to Hitler's face and expressed his desire to win back Northern Transylvania by force of arms. Apparently his outspoken attitude, which enabled him to match the Führer's harangues ("Er monologisierte genau wie dieser") plus his enthusiastic hatred of the Slavs and willing-

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The Agrarian Question

● 668 The agrarian policy of the Iron Guard may be dismissed briefly. The Legionaries prided themselves on having no formal program and they were in power only five months. During its years of growth the Iron Guard had gained extensive influence among the peasants because of its range of emotional appeals and even more because of its extravagant if nebulous promises to provide land. As has been said, however, the slogan, omul şi pogonul was less a directive—which would have been absurd, since a pogon equals half a hectare—than an emotional rally. For example, one of the Legionary writers, A. Balota, said that there should be a return to the village, not "to seek under false democratic pretexts social justice for the worker on the land, but to achieve ethnic justice for the peasant." [15]

The activities of the Guard during its five months in office appear to have been little more than pillage and extortion. Some of the actions purported to be in the Robin Hood tradition of taking from the rich to give to the poor, but the taking was far more evident than the giving. The Guard was active in the villages; there were incessant parades, processions and ceremonies but no constructive action. The only important land measure was a decree converting Jewish-held rural property into state property, in exchange for "interest-bearing securities." Land thus obtained was to be used to provide for refugees from Bessarabia, Transylvania, and Bucovina. The abysmal failure of the Guard, for all its *élan* and promises, to achieve anything for the peasant increased the skepticism among the peasants, if such was possible, that anything good could come from the powers above.[16] The importance of the Iron Guard to the agrarian question does not lie in anything which it achieved, for it achieved nothing, but in evidence it affords of the dead rot in Rumanian society.

Although Antonescu frequently expressed his love for the Ru-

15. A. Balota, *Satul învoi de vinja romînească*, quoted in Pătrăşcanu, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

16. In this connection I recall a conversation with a group of peasants in the village of Hangu in the Moldavian Carpathians in January, 1945. Like most mountain villagers they were desperately land hungry, and were particularly resentful that several thousand hectares of land, mostly forest, belonged to one large landowner. At that time they were curious to learn more about the activities of Petru Groza's Ploughmen's Front, whose organizers had not yet reached them. They were of course interested in the prospects of having more land but stated they were very skeptical of such promises. A number of the men in the village had joined the Iron Guard in the hope of obtaining land; they had not received any land but had been imprisoned when the Guard was suppressed.

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manian peasant,[17] under his dictatorship the overriding concerns were mobilizing agriculture for the war, compensating for the lost territories (though part of these were regained after 1941), and maintaining production against the drain on manpower and the requisitioning of equipment and livestock for military purposes. The majority of acts were specific war measures: price controls, export controls, laws against agricultural sabotage and speculation, control of livestock, state requisitioning of cereals, crop planning, and the mobilization of agricultural labor. Most of the measures had been initiated in Carol's reign under the trade agreement with Germany and the five-year plan for agriculture, but the war intensified them and put them on a directly military footing. By necessity there was an increase in the mobilization of agricultural labor. Field commandos and labor gangs were sent about the country under the supervision of gendarmes and rural agents of the Ministry of Agriculture.

An attempt was made to compensate for the shortage of manpower and livestock by increasing agricultural equipment, largely through import from Germany. If the figures are to be trusted imports in 1941 and 1942 were quite extensive:[18]

	1941	*1942*
Tractors with ploughs	1,000	2,814
Animal-drawn ploughs	20,000	40,000
Sowing drills	4,000	1,400
Harvesters	2,000	2,230
Hoes	10,000	30,000
Harrows	4,000	9,200
Threshers	200	230

By a law of June 22, 1942, for the organization of agricultural associations, the government attempted to overcome the disadvantages of small strip farming by means reminiscent of the Iorga law of 1931. By this act a group of at least fifteen cultivators residing in the same commune could constitute an agricultural association, authorized to purchase farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, etc., sell produce in common, purchase or lease land, and obtain credit. The association was not an independent body however. It was to be man-

17. According to an admiring German biography, Antonescu first attracted attention during the 1907 uprising when, as a young lieutenant, he succeeded, without firing a shot, in persuading a crowd of rebellious peasants to disband.

18. Brief accounts of the measures undertaken up to 1943 are given by N. D. Cornăţeanu, "International Chronicle of Agriculture: Rumania," *International Review of Agriculture*, 32 (Rome, July–August, 1941), 267E–284E; and 34 (April, 1943), 126E–134E.

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XII

THE COMMUNIST PERIOD: THE ADVENT TO POWER, 1944–45

ON August 23, 1944, King Michael, with the cooperation of a four-party bloc comprising the National Peasants, the Liberals, the Socialists, and the Communists overthrew Marshal Antonescu through a skillful palace coup d'état. On September 12 Rumania signed an armistice with the Allies. Six months later, on March 6, 1945, the Groza government, nominally a coalition but dominated by the Communist party, came into office and has remained in power since that date.

The sudden flowering of the Rumanian Communist party, the result of external rather than internal influences, marks a definite break in the continuity of Rumanian politics. Communism was not totally lacking a past in Rumania, and the Communist program had a relevance to Rumanian problems, but without the direct and active intervention of the Soviet Union the Groza government would not have obtained office. To be sure, the Conservative Marghiloman cabinet of 1918 was the direct consequence of Germany's military successes on the Eastern Front; the return of Brătianu in the same year was made possible by the Allied victory. The fall of Vintilă Brătianu and the success of the National Peasants in 1928 were to some extent connected with Rumania's foreign financial relations. Above all, Carol's fall and the Iron Guard and Antonescu dictatorships were certainly conditioned by the Nazi hegemony over southeastern Europe. Rumania has always been affected in its internal politics by direct or indirect foreign influences. Nevertheless, there is a difference.

All the preceding political changes hitherto considered were effected by parties or groups, which, if they were not popular, were at least associated with important Rumanian institutions. Thus the Liberals, the extent of whose popular support was doubtful, formed the oldest party in Rumania and were in control of the nation's banking and financial apparatus. Carol made use of the institution of the monarchy and its tradition of royal paternalism. Antonescu relied upon the army. The National Peasants, less well connected with the institutional framework, one of their weaknesses, were, in their period of growth, the representatives of a broad mass movement in the peas-

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antry. As for the Iron Guard, while its rise was in part fostered by sympathetic politicians and its temporary success after Carol's fall was with the approval of the Germans, it was in its insane way the culmination of a widespread indigenous fascist impulse which had been building up in the interwar years.

The Rumanian Communists, on the other hand, while not altogether without support, enjoyed neither wide popularity (party membership in 1944 was approximately 1,000) nor control of the instruments of power, and they could not, in 1945 at least, have gained the latter without the aid of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, the previous political movements had by 1945 become rather threadbare, either through internal disintegration, senility, or public failure, and one might argue that a break with the past was salutary. But that the Communists were to create the new dispensation was in no way a Rumanian decision. Whatever the merits or shortcomings of communism as such, the Groza government was a Soviet creation. The implications of this fact will be considered shortly.

History of Marxist Parties in Rumania

In the first half of the nineteenth century there were slight signs of pre-Marxist socialism in the Rumanian principalities.[1] Some of Fourier's and Louis Blanc's ideas had been picked up by Rumanian students in Paris, and indeed a short-lived phalanstery was formed at Scaeni near Ploești. Marxist socialism, however, came to Rumania by way of Russia. In the 1870's Iași, capital of Moldavia, was a meeting place and haven for Russian revolutionaries. In 1879 the first Rumanian socialist newspaper, *Basarabia*, was published; its editorials were along Bakuninist-anarchist lines, with a strange flavor of anti-Semitism. In 1881 the first small socialist group in Iași was disbanded by the Rumanian authorities upon the demand of the Russian government.

Between 1887 and 1897 the socialist movement in Rumania revived and developed. Like many currents of foreign thought, Marxism in Rumania was something of a fad. All manner of people employed the terminology. Its political content was loosely defined and combined with anarchist and populist ideas. The intellectual leader of Rumanian socialism was the Russian emigré Constantin Dobrogeanu-

1. For a brief account of the socialist movement in Rumania, cf. N. Ghiulea, "Labour Organisations in Rumania," *International Labour Review*, 9, No. 1 (January, 1924), 31–49. C. Titel Petrescu has a lengthy but scrappily organised account in *Socialismul în Romînia*. Trotsky was in Bucarest in 1913; his articles on the Rumanian socialist movement are collected in *Ocherki politicheskoi Rumynii*.

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668 175 Gherea, whose stream of articles defining Marxism and applying it to Rumania had a lasting influence not only upon Rumanian socialism but upon Rumanian thought in general. In 1884 a socialist study group appeared in Bucarest, and in the following year a newspaper, *Rights of Man*. In 1890 a socialist club began to enter candidates in local and national elections. In 1893 was founded the Rumanian Social Democratic party with a program based upon that of the German Social Democrats. Rumania was recognized as a backward country which could not take the initiative in the socialist movement. The work of the Rumanian socialists was to be preparatory, their tactics moderate and legal. The demands of the program were universal suffrage, administrative decentralization, abolition of the standing army, separation of church and state, equal conditions for women, secularization of schools, equal application of laws, the right of association, limitation of the royal prerogative, a progressive income tax, and an eight-hour day. The program was explicitly antirevolutionary. The new party attempted to organize workers in the few industrial centers of the country, Bucarest, Galaţi, Brăila, and Ploeşti, and to anchor the socialist movement to the nascent trade unions. It also tried in 1897 to spread socialism in the villages, but this effort was immediately suppressed by the Conservative government. For the most part, however, in this period the socialist movement was confined to intellectuals, who had made a good deal of progress toward formulating a program which they felt suitable to Rumania's special needs.

Between 1898 and 1900 the socialists hit a crisis. A section of the party, weary of the political wilderness and seeing no future in isolation, were tempted by the devil, collaboration. In 1899, under their influence, the party changed its name from Social Democrat to National Democrat on the grounds that Rumania was not ripe for socialism. In 1900 Constantin Stere, later the populist leader, split the party by taking a group into the Liberal camp. By the turn of the century the first effort at creating a socialist party had collapsed in confusion and disagreement.

The Russian revolution of 1905 and the significant increase in urban and labor population led to a second revival of socialism. In this phase the party found a broader base of support; it had more contact with the working class and the trade unions, and a talented leader in Christian Rakovsky, a doctor of Bulgarian-Dobrogean origin with international socialist connections. The tactics of the party were still reformist. While labor groups in a few towns sided with the peasants in the 1907 uprising, the Social Democratic party

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took an altogether negative view and admonished the peasants to retire, as they were only playing into the hands of their adversaries. Nevertheless, in the repression that followed, the Liberal government suppressed the Social Democratic party and expelled Rakovsky from the country as an undesirable alien. He was later readmitted by the Conservative government.

The Rumanian Social Democrats campaigned against the Balkan wars, against Rumania's participation, and against the annexation of the Dobrogean quadrilateral. They came out for a federative republic of all the Balkan states, including Turkey. When the First World War came they maintained their antiwar stand and demanded Balkan neutrality. An inter-Balkan socialist conference held in Bucarest in July, 1915, issued a resolution favoring the German antiwar Socialists, Liebknecht and Luxemburg, and the Russian Left-wing socialists; opposing class collaboration and "social patriotism"; and criticizing the passivity of the Bureau of the Second International. On June 15, 1916, just before Rumania's entry into the war, the workers of Galaţi demonstrated against Rumanian participation. After Rumania entered the war, the Social Democrats remained opposed but ineffective. Party papers were confiscated, meetings disbanded, and Rakovsky arrested and imprisoned.

A new phase appeared with the outbreak of the 1917 revolution in Russia. On the first of May Russian troops liberated Rakovsky from the prison at Iaşi, and during the period of complete confusion on the Eastern Front in 1917 and 1918 the Rumanian socialist movement more or less merged with the Russian revolution. Rakovsky himself took an increasingly important part in the Russian revolution, becoming president of the Ukrainian Sovnarkom in 1919. Rumanian Social Democrats, under Mihai Gheorghiu Bujor, formed a Rumanian revolutionary battalion with its headquarters in Odessa. Inside Rumania itself, however, the socialists were repressed, both in Iaşi, held by the Rumanian government, and in Bucarest, occupied by the Germans.

At the end of the war, in the autumn of 1918, the social situation in Rumania was unsettled, and three years later Rakovsky observed, oversanguinely, that "the prospects of a revolutionary movement were excellent, the position of the administration was critical."[2] Within the country new radical parties sprang up, expressing the widespread dislike of Ion I. C. Brătianu, who was considered responsible for Rumania's involvement in a ruinous war. Externally revolutions were stirring in Austria, Hungary, and Germany. On the other

2. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

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668 175 hand, the steps taken toward agrarian reform in 1917 and 1918 provided a safety valve for peasant unrest. Rumania was among the victorious powers and Brătianu was soon to fight for its territorial rewards. The Bessarabian issue was already introducing a national element into the relations with Bolshevik Russia. At the same time Brătianu took firm measures against signs of social upheaval.

On December 13, 1918, the government harshly repressed a labor manifestation at the National Theater in Bucarest.[3] Social tension continued through 1919 and 1920 and reached a final climax in the abortive general strike of October 20–28, 1920. The strike was set off by the restrictive measures of the Averescu government, which had been called in as a party of discipline and order. The general council of the Social Democratic party and leaders of the labor syndicates had presented the government with demands to respect the right of association, to recognize work councils in industrial establishments, to remove troops from all factories, and to abolish the state of siege and censorship. The government responded by arresting the socialist and labor leaders, including the deputies to the chamber. The general strike which followed was precipitated by an independent strike of the workers in the railway shops, always the most militant section of Rumanian labor. The strike lasted only seven days and the government had little trouble in breaking it.

After the failure of the general strike the Rumanian socialist movement split, the more radical section forming the Communist party and the moderates the Social Democratic party. Before 1914 the Rumanian socialists had followed the moderate policy of the Second International and were perhaps even more moderate because of Rumania's situation as a backward agrarian state. The war, however, had the effect of associating the party with the more radical section of the international socialist movement. This trend to the Left was not for doctrinal reasons; the Rumanian socialists had not taken a Leninist position. Rather it was because the big Social Democratic parties in the West, in France and Germany, had become involved in the war and because the Russian Marxists, with whom the Rumanian socialist leaders had close personal contacts, were becoming the standard-bearers of militant socialism. Moreover, the antiwar stand of the Rumanian socialists had put them into conflict with the authorities and driven many of them into illegal activity. Finally, the Russian revolution itself produced a wave of enthusiasm which quite

3. According to the socialist leader Moscovici, the demonstration had no revolutionary intent, had occurred more or less by accident, and the socialist leaders had not known of it in advance. Petrescu, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

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overpowered any doubts about the "ripeness" of east European countries for the socialist revolution. Thus, such men as Rakovsky and Al. Dobrogeanu-Gherea (the son of the socialist leader), who had been reformists before the war, joined the Communist camp.[4]

According to Rakovsky, the program of the party congress of April, 1919, accepted the basic theses of the Third International, but this trend was opposed by the Social Democratic leaders of Bucovina and Transylvania who were closer to the traditions of Austrian and Hungarian Social Democracy.[5] In 1920 a group of Rumanian delegates was sent to Moscow—solely as observers according to the socialist Petrescu—to examine the situation in Russia and to inform themselves on the principles of the Comintern. This group returned in January, 1921, and it transpired that they had affiliated the Rumanian party with the Third International. A general council met in February, at which the Communists gained control (according to Petrescu, the socialist leaders were in prison as a result of the general strike) and called a general congress for May, 1921. The government now stepped in and arrested for high treason all the delegates to the congress who voted for affiliation, some 70 in number.

After 1921 the Social Democrats and the Communists went their separate ways. In 1922 the Communists attempted to establish a united front in the trade union movement but were defeated. At a general council, the trade unions maintained their political independence; trade union members could belong to any party but party activity within the unions was to be prohibited. In 1925 the General Council of Trade Unions affiliated with the Amsterdam International Federation. The Communists in retaliation set up a "United" Trade Union General Council which never achieved a substantial following but which rendered any trade union activity liable to government repression.

The history of Rumanian Social Democracy between the wars is not inspiring, and the party never achieved a large following. It based itself upon the trade unions, a rather narrow foundation for a political party in Rumania. Moreover, it was never quite clear what the relations between socialism and the trade unions should be. Most of the Social Democratic leaders were trade union officials but in many cases they favored complete separation of political and union activities. There is little evidence that the Socialists had any success

4. This enthusiastic and nondoctrinal support of revolution was of course the cause of later friction when the Third International undertook to impose the Leninist outlook on the member parties.

5. Trotsky and Rakovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

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668 175 in improving labor conditions, partly because of their anxiety lest their actions be considered subversive.[6] The Rumanian trade union movement remained weak,[7] legislation passed to assist labor was not applied, and the representatives of industry were successful in impeding labor reforms on the grounds of national interest.[8]

As a political party the Social Democrats had a fundamental handicap. In their interpretation of Marxism they believed that Rumania had not yet reached the stage where it could embark upon or even directly prepare for the socialist revolution. The hopes of the party lay not in Rumania itself but in the advanced states of the West. One of the party leaders, Ilie Moscovici, said in 1923: "Lacking the objective factors—the concentration of capital, sufficient development of industry, and a large proletarian mass—and not having the subjective factors—education and a class conscious proletariat—Rumania suffers all the contradictions of the capitalist regime without having the necessary factors for social transformation." [9] Such a passive outlook, which was admittedly depending upon developments beyond Rumania to realize its ideals, was scarcely likely to win an enthusiastic following. The Social Democrats considered it their principal function to remove the obstacles set by the oligarchy to the free industrial and capitalist development of Rumania, to lift the cultural level of the masses, to bring democracy to Rumania, and to foster international cooperation of labor.

Because of their weak position the Socialists wobbled between maintaining doctrinal purity and collaborating with other parties. They

6. For example, M. Flueraş, in 1926, felt it necessary to explain rather apologetically that the great interest shown by the workers in labor legislation should not be interpreted as a revolutionary tendency. ILO, *Industrial and Labor Information, 17*, No. 7 (February 15, 1926), 231.

7. Trade union membership increased only from 25,000 in 1919 to 42,000 in 1929. Transylvania and the Banat had, in 1929, 25,000 members, the Old Kingdom only 11,000, Bucovina, 6,000, and Bessarabia, 700. *Ibid., 33*, No. 8 (February 24, 1930), 265.

8. In 1934 the Rumanian Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Labor which said, among other things, "The improvement of the living conditions of workers can only be gradually achieved. Any defiance of this rule must be detrimental to the national economy in that it would bring about both a weakening of the credit of the state and an increase in unemployment, thus leading to a worsening of social conditions. The present limits of economic possibility can only be exceeded by means of an increase of production brought about through the formation of new capital and through an increase in the productive capacity of labor on a sound economic basis." *Ibid., 49*, No. 11 (March 12, 1934), 852. To a degree, of course, this statement was perfectly true. On the other hand, the constant reports of employers' infringements of labor laws, such as the weekly rest act, leave no doubt that their actions were hardly determined by any such general considerations. Cf. *Ibid., 52*, No. 11 (December 10, 1934), 325, report by the Rumanian Chamber of Labor on the application of labor laws.

9. "Lupta de clasă şi transformarea socială," *Doctrinele partidelor politice*, p. 302.

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worked with the National Peasants in the 1926 communal elections in an effort to oust the Liberals, and again in the general elections of 1928 which established the Maniu government. A dissenting splinter group broke away to form an Independent Socialist party, somewhat to the Left of the Social Democrats and advocating collaboration with "legal" Communists. Collaboration between the National Peasants and the Social Democrats ceased shortly after the former came to power. The Socialists charged the Maniu government with betraying the working class; at a party congress held in 1930 collaboration was condemned and the party reaffirmed its independence and single-minded loyalty to the workers.

In the years leading up to the Carolist dictatorship the Social Democrats were altogether ineffective and powerless. They drafted numerous resolutions against fascism and in favor of democracy, but were in no position to do anything about either. In 1935 and 1936, when courted by the Communists, who had adopted the Popular Front, they replied that they were unwilling to sign any agreement with the various Communist-front organizations and that common action was possible only if the Communists came into the open and renounced their illegal activities. In the 1937 elections they refused to have anything to do with the National Peasants because of the pact with Codreanu, and succeeded only in reuniting with the Independent Socialists, an achievement of little consequence.

After the overthrow of the parliamentary regime in 1938, the Social Democrats folded up. The collaborationist spirit again made its appearance. The party reexamined its theoretical principles and altered its definition of the state, which was no longer seen as a class instrument but as "an instrument useful and necessary to all." [10] Two of the Social Democratic leaders, Flueraş and Mirescu, entered the labor commission of the Goga-Cuza government. When Carol replaced the trade unions by corporatist bodies, the General Confederation of Labor was absorbed into the Front of National Rebirth, and one of the Socialist leaders, Grigorovici, became an undersecretary in the Ministry of Labor under the dictatorship.[11]

If the Social Democrats found agrarian Rumania an unpromising

10. This change was expressed in an article by Lotar Rădăceanu in *Gândul Vremii* (March–June, 1938), cited in Pătrăşcanu, *Problemele de bază*, p. 269. Pătrăşcanu was very critical of the theoretical position adopted by Rădăceanu and stated that it cleared the way to accepting the Carolist dictatorship. Still, such facility has its advantages. Rădăceanu is now in the Groza government whereas Pătrăşcanu was discharged from the Ministry of Justice and ousted from the Communist party.

11. Titel Petrescu, while admitting a good deal of opportunism in these actions, defends them as necessary to preserve what rights still remained to labor.

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environment for their moderate Marxism and their reliance upon the urban working class, the Communists encountered far more serious obstacles. In Rumania the question of communism was completely entangled in the issue of Soviet-Rumanian relations. More than in most European countries communism and high treason were regarded as completely synonymous terms. This national conflict, which the Rumanian Communists could not begin to overcome, dogged their efforts from the start. Rumania's relations with Russia had never been very good; tsarist Russia may have acted as protector of the Balkan Christians, but its own interests in the Black Sea littoral had always been a source of anxiety to the Rumanian principalities. The dispute over Bessarabia, beginning in 1812 and heightened by the territorial transfers of 1856 and 1878, was a constant source of irritation. Because of the Rumanian occupation of Bessarabia in 1918, the Soviet Union and Rumania did not resume full diplomatic relations until 1934.

In addition to this territorial dispute, the Communists faced another difficulty. The Third International was founded in the hope and expectation that the disasters and havoc of the First World War would create sufficient social upheaval to bring about the proletarian revolution. But as has been seen, while revolution threatened to gain the upper hand in many eastern European states, Rumania stood fast and indeed sent troops to put down Bela Kun's Soviet regime in Hungary. As a result Rumania, perhaps more than any state of eastern Europe, regarded itself as the bulwark against bolshevism, both against Soviet territorial advance and against the Communist revolutionary doctrine. All sides were in agreement on the point. Rumanian authors repeatedly referred to the agrarian reform as the most effective protection against communism. At the League of Nations and other international meetings, Rumania exerted a good deal of diplomatic pressure on the grounds of its importance as an outpost against the Soviet Union. For their part the Russians saw in Rumania one of the key points of the *cordon sanitaire*, an advance base for the malevolent capitalist states.

Where were the Communists to find their support in such a country? They sought it among the proletariat, the small peasants, and the national minorities. The proletariat, as the Social Democrats discovered, was too small to be effective, although the Communists did obtain their few nuclei in the industrial centers. As for the small peasants, the Communists, unlike the Social Democrats, tried hard to penetrate the countryside but the land reforms had weakened its revolutionary potentialities. Besides, the Peasant party was much more likely to obtain the support of the peasantry, and did. The

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Communists did have some success with the minorities (the present leaders of Rumanian communism, Pauker, Luca, and Bodnaraş are all from the ethnic minorities), but any success in this direction would only intensify the feeling that they were an antinational and treasonous party.

Finally, the Communists were handicapped by the fact that almost from the outset they were an illegal party and with but occasional relaxations remained so throughout the interwar period. Although most of the Rumanian governments were not averse to having the Communists as a whipping boy, the Communists brought a good deal of their difficulties on their own heads by their tactics, which were devious, disingenuous, and unsuccessful. In 1921 Rakovsky remarked with some bitterness that General Averescu was arresting not only the "illegal" party workers but those working "lawfully." [12] In a similar spirit a Communist pamphlet of 1925, describing the uprising at Tatar Bunar in Bessarabia, castigated the cordon sanitaire and the provocative accusations that the Soviet Union was stirring up trouble, but went on to say, "Not only the free booters of Bucarest, but the capitalists of the whole world are trembling before the convulsions of the proletarian giant. They fear that the red wave rolling out of the East will burst the Dniester dam and flood onward to the coast of the Atlantic Ocean." [13] Although this dual policy of pursuing both legal and illegal activities received a brilliant defense and elaboration in Lenin's pamphlet, *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, it has probably, in the long run, done the Communists far more harm than good. It may be, as Lenin said, that a good warrior should know all his weapons, legal as well as illegal, parliamentary as well as revolutionary, but such a military plan of campaign should have remained a highly classified document, not a broadside, and was bound to lose effectiveness with repetition. As soon as the enemy became aware of this tactic the Communists were left open to the charge of bad faith no matter what course they followed. In the case of Rumania, of course, they had very little opportunity for any legal activity in their own name, but their efforts to achieve fronts of one complexion or another in the 1920's and 1930's were all unsuccessful.

The Rumanian Communist party got off to an unfortunate start. The arrest in 1921 of the delegates who had voted for affiliation with the Third International deprived it of many of its leaders. Among

12. Ch. Rakovsky, "The Communist Movement in Roumania," *The Communist International*, No. 18 (n.d.), pp. 112–114.

13. *Bessarabia . . . The Roumanian Hell*, published in English by the British Section of the International Class War Prisoners Aid (London, n.d.), p. 13.

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668 175 the active members who took their place was Ana Pauker, a young Jewish schoolteacher from Moldavia who had joined an illegal group in the Social Democratic par[illegible] in 1918. She had married Marcel Pauker, son of a leading Rumanian publisher.[14] Elected to the Central Committee she became one of the party's most determined fighters. In 1924 when the party was definitely outlawed, she was arrested, but was subsequently released and left the country.

The directives of the Comintern did not facilitate the work of the Rumanian Communists. For example, the resolution on the national question, passed by the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International, stated that under the Versailles system a number of small imperialist states had been created in eastern Europe to fight the proletarian revolution.[15] The states had been formed by the annexation of large territories with foreign populations.

> At the same time the struggle of the oppressed peoples against national oppression has become a struggle against the power of the imperialistic bourgeoisie who were victorious in the world war, since the strengthening of the new imperialist powers means the strengthening of the forces of world imperialism. The importance of the struggle against national oppression is still further augmented by the fact that the nationalities oppressed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Greece, in their social composition are largely peasants, and the struggle for their national liberation is at the same time the struggle of the peasant masses against foreign landlords and capitalists.

Under these conditions, the resolution declared, the general formula, "The right of every nation to self-determination even to the extent of separation," should be rendered more specific: "The political separation of oppressed peoples from Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Greece." The resolution noted with disapproval that certain Communist parties were falling into deviations on this question, that their slogans were not directed against the states founded on national oppression but toward partial reform and autonomy within existing boundaries.

The resolution was even more specific on the Ukrainian question, an evident example of the overlapping of Soviet and Comintern aims. The congress declared that the Ukrainian national problems in Po-

14. C. G. Costa-Foru, *Aus den Folterkammern Rumäniens*, p. 21; C. Bobrovskaya, "Two Bolshevik Heroines," *The Communist International*, 14, No. 3 (1937), 958–960.

15. "Resolution of V. World Congress of Comintern on National Question in Central Europe and Balkans," *The Communist International*, New Ser., No. 7 (December, 1924–January, 1925), pp. 93–99.

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land, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia formed one Ukrainian problem demanding a common solution for all three countries. In this case it opposed slogans of autonomy for Carpathian Russia, the western Ukraine, Bessarabia, and Bucovina because they were directed toward forming a coalition with the wealthy strata of the Ukrainian peasantry. The congress, therefore, considered it necessary "for the Communist Parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania to launch the general slogan of separation of the Ukrainian lands from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and their union with the Soviet Ukraine and through it with the U.S.S.R." As for Transylvania and Dobrogea, the congress merely recommended that these areas be separated from Rumania and made independent regions.

Much of the nationalities program of the congress was admirable, its opposition to the hypernationalism of the Balkan states, its championing of national equality and cultural and educational rights for minorities. But these reform measures were clearly of less importance than the demand for separation. It is difficult to see how a party advocating the loss of Transylvania, Dobrogea, Bessarabia, and Bucovina was going to gain much popularity in Rumania, especially when the majority of the population in these areas (with the exception of Bucovina) and much the greatest number of peasants were Rumanians. With such instructions the Rumanian Communist party was never able to shake off the imputation of being an antinational party.

In addition to handing out such uncomfortable assignments, the Comintern heckled the Rumanian Communists for lapsing into any number of deviations. Because the party had been forced underground, it had been unable to conduct the necessary educational campaign to bolshevize itself, with the result that there were deplorable signs of "ultra-left and right liquidatorial tendencies." [16] The Sixth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1926 felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian Communists and directed them to correct their errors. Specifically the party was to issue a journal, fight the Right-wing deviations, and "struggle against even the smallest sectional manifestations."

At this time the party was troubled by two questions, the trade union issue and a united front against the Liberals. With regard to the "unitary" trade unions and their relations to the Amsterdam Union, the Central Committee of the Rumanian Communist party issued the following orders:

16. Al. Badulescu, in a review of the Rumanian party organ *Lupta de Clasă*, *The Communist International*, 4, No. 15 (October 15, 1927), 311-312.

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668 175 The duty of mobilizing the working class masses to insure the legality of the unitary trade unions is a primary one for us Communists. Although the unitary trade unions are not by any means a Communist organization and still less a Communist Party organization, as the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie together maintain, they are the one legal organization based on the class struggle, and it is the duty of the Communists to use all their influence in the unitary and reformist trade unions, in the workshops and factories, for rousing the worker to fight for the legality of the unitary trade unions.

With this approach it is not surprising that the Social Democrats should have complained that wherever the Communists showed an interest in trade union matters, it was disastrous to the unions.

The Sixth Plenum criticized the Rumanian Communist party for its tactical errors in the 1926 communal elections when the party had preached the tactics of the united front of the working class with all opposition bourgeois parties against the Liberal oligarchy. This policy was considered to involve a serious misreading of the Rumanian situation. The error—it was an error in 1926 at any rate—lay in failing to realize that the Liberals were the most highly developed section of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, and that no real anti-Liberal bloc on the side of the opposition parties (i.e., the National Peasants) was possible. The effort to create such a bloc was a serious error, since it "obscures the class-consciousness of the working class, it gives rise to illusions which prevent the crystallization of the one social force which is actually capable of putting an end to the dictatorship of the Liberals: the united front of the proletariat with the broad masses of the peasantry, liberated from the guardianship of the opposition bourgeoisie." In effect this meant that the Communists were not to work with the National Peasants in ousting the Liberals but were rather to attract the peasants away from them.

In terms of the Rumanian situation this tactical directive of the Comintern was absolutely hopeless, although in a negative way it was correct in forecasting the difficulties in ousting the Liberals from their entrenched positions in the Rumanian economy. It must also be admitted that the Communists foresaw the dangers of Carol's return. "The 'Persecution and Exile of Prince Carol,' " said *Lupta de Clasă*, the party organ, "utilized politically by the opposition bourgeoisie can win over petty-bourgeois sections and create the illusion among many workers that a Rumanian 'Mussolini' regime would be in a position to change the miserable conditions of the masses. That Prince Carol is closely associated with the fascist organizations in Rumania is an open secret."

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As might be expected, the victory of the National Peasants in 1928 caused no rejoicing among the Communists. In later years they wrote of the National Peasants as having come in on a wave of popular protest against the Liberals; but the Communists themselves were hostile to the National Peasants before 1928 and fought with them throughout their term in office. Under the National Peasants Bessarabia remained a center of discontent and international friction; Vaida Voevod courted the Iron Guard as allies against the Communists.

To some extent at least this conflict arose from the fact that the National Peasants came to office at just the time the Comintern went off on an ultra-Left tangent, denouncing socialists as social-fascists, and appeared firmly convinced that the Western powers were preparing an immediate assault upon the Soviet Union.[17] During this period Rumania was considered to have a foremost place in the anti-Soviet plans of the Western imperialists. All the energies of the National Peasants were described as being employed against the U.S.S.R., and even the feeble Rumanian Social Democrats were called warmongers.[18]

The Comintern again felt called upon to rebuke the Rumanian comrades. "In spite of the most savage terror, the Communist Party lives and becomes stronger. The only obstacle in the path to the growth of its influence over the proletariat and the toiling masses lies in the *slow* surmounting of *right opportunist* conceptions in some sections of its work, particularly in the field of the peasant movement." [19] The error here was the old heresy of regarding the peasantry as a social unit and failing to split the poor peasants from the kulaks. Counting on the depression to produce a revolutionary situation—although the swing to the Left had preceded the depression—the Comintern apparently had hopes of bringing social issues to the boil. "The increasing upsurge of the class struggle creates a basis on which the Communist Party could win the trust of the toiling masses, establish its hegemony. . . . With a correct policy the Communist Party can become a factor for the acceleration of the approach of a revolutionary situation." [20]

In retrospect this ultra-Left tactic of the early 1930's must be regarded as a disaster which wrought a great deal of damage. The

17. Of course these suspicions were fed by such events as Maniu's reported request in 1930 that the British survey the Black Sea coast with a view to constructing a strong naval base near Constanța. Pavel Pavel, *Why Rumania Failed*, p. 240.

18. T. Marin, "The Role of Rumania in Intervention against the U.S.S.R.," *The Communist International*, 7, No. 10 (May 15, 1931), 800.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 802.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 803.

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668 175 veering from Right to Left in the Comintern in the 1920's had brought no results but had merely caused the local parties to be regarded as altogether untrustworthy and treacherous political allies. The tactics in 1930 of smearing all non-Communist groups as fascist certainly did nothing to prevent the rise of fascism. It is hard to say how important this was in Rumania. The Rumanian Communist party was clearly on the fringes of politics and failed to make any appreciable headway. By its irresponsible behavior, however, it enabled the parties of the Right to use the Communist label as a means of discrediting all working class activity.

The last effort of the Rumanian Communists to pursue a revolutionary line was the Griviţa railway strike of 1933, in which many of the later Communist leaders—Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, and Pătrăşcanu—were involved and arrested. This strike, which began with economic demands, quickly assumed a political character. Vaida Voevod's National Peasant government violently suppressed it. After that, as Pătrăşcanu said, the radicalization of the masses served to fortify the Iron Guard and the labor movement was put on the defensive.

The rise of Hitler and the realization that the fascist onslaught was not necessarily the immediate prelude to the Communist revolution was belatedly met by a shift in the party line, officially inaugurated at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International held in the summer of 1935. Gheorghe Dimitrov, in the leading speeches, criticized the previous practice of calling Social Democrats social-fascists and came out for a popular front of democratic forces against fascism. Reflecting this change was an article by one of the Rumanian Communist leaders, Boris Stefanov.[21] "We are basing ourselves," he said, "upon the undoubted fact that the overwhelming majority of the working population of Rumania and even a considerable section of the bourgeoisie are opposed to fascism." What was required was a concentration of democratic forces, including the bourgeois parties, in an anti-fascist Popular Front. The Social Democrats were requested not to remain aloof and even the National Peasants received moderate praise: "The National Tsaranist (Peasant) Party is one of the biggest mass democratic forces in Rumania. Despite all the waverings and reactionary tendencies of some of its leaders, despite its great sins in the past in its relation to the Ru-

21. Boris Stefanov, "The Concentration of Democratic Forces in Rumania," *The Communist International, 14,* No. 3 (1937), 948. Stefanov, in 1920, had been one of the members of the general council of the Socialist party who signed the ultimatum for the general strike.

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manian people, the National Peasant Party is nevertheless today one of the most important anti-Fascist forces." Stefanov undertook to refute criticisms that the Communist party was undemocratic, illegal, and antinational. As to the charge that it put forward irredentist slogans aimed at separating the new provinces from Rumania he replied that while the Communist party was against national oppression and for national self-determination it was the sworn enemy of the fascists who were trying to utilize the national issue to tear away Transylvania and Dobrogea and subject them to the fascist yoke. Significantly, even in this reconciliatory mood there was no mention of Bessarabia.

This change of tactics had no important results in the course of Rumanian politics. The Social Democrats remained suspicious and aloof. A Democratic Union was set up in the last years of the Tătărescu cabinet for the purpose of achieving a broad coalition against the extreme Right but, as Pătrăşcanu said, while it was a legal movement it worked "in the ideological cadres of the Communist Party." [22] The Tătărescu government dealt severely with the Communists. In November, 1934, the party, with all its affiliates, was again dissolved; although it had never been reinstated after 1924 its front, the Workers and Peasants bloc, had participated in elections in the early 1930's. In 1936 was held the much publicized trial of nineteen Communists, including Ana Pauker who received a sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

At the time of the 1937 elections the Communists again attempted to create a Popular Front. This effort was foiled by the Maniu-Codreanu pact and by the Social Democrats' refusal to cooperate with either the National Peasants or the Communists. The Communists eventually threw their modicum of support to the National Peasants, a move which was later regarded as a mistake.[23] In retrospect it is indeed lamentable that some sort of Popular Front was not created in 1937, the last relatively free election which Rumania was to enjoy, but certainly the Communists by their previous activity had contributed to rendering such a front impossible and must share the responsibility for the breakdown of Rumanian parliamentary government.

Shortly after the German-Soviet pact, in December, 1939, Boris Stefanov, the same who had ardently supported the Popular Front

22. Pătrăşcanu, *Sous trois dictatures*, p. 110.

23. According to Pătrăşcanu, the Communists should have forced collaboration upon the Social Democrats, who, in his view, could not easily have refused; if the Social Democratic leaders had later tried to break away, they could have been unmasked. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

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668 175 and had denied that the Communist party was antinational, wrote an article in *The Communist International* attacking British and French capital and its attempt to drag Rumania into the imperialist war, insisting that Rumania's interests demanded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union (presumably modeled after the Soviet treaties with the Baltic states which involved the establishment of Russian bases and armed forces in these countries) and directing the Rumanian Communists to work for the right of self-determination in the annexed provinces (Bessarabia, Bucovina, Transylvania, and Dobrogea), even if this meant their political separation from Rumania. Although the Soviet Foreign Office publicly denied that Stefanov represented the views of the Soviet government, the article provides some evidence that the Russian interest in Rumania at this time was not limited solely to the recovery of Bessarabia. When this province and Northern Bucovina were taken over in the summer of 1940, the Rumanian Communists naturally defended the action and placed the blame on Carol for his bellicose declaration in the spring that he would fight for these areas. One other event, of importance for the future, occurred in 1940: Ana Pauker, who had been in a Rumanian prison since 1936, was exchanged for two members of the Rumanian parliament who had been picked up in Bessarabia when the Russians moved in.

After Hitler's declaration of war on the Soviet Union, the Rumanian Communists again shifted their tactics and called for resistance to the German aggression, but unlike the Communists in Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia they seem to have achieved very little in the way of partisan activity or sabotage.[24]

The Formation of the Groza Government

In 1944 a four-party bloc headed by Iuliu Maniu for the National Peasants, Constantin Brătianu for the Liberals, C. Titel Petrescu for the Social Democrats, and Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu for the Communists collaborated with King Michael and his intimate advisers in preparing for the coup d'état of August 23 which ousted Marshal Antonescu, expelled the Germans from Bucarest, and brought Rumania to the side of the Allies. Negotiations for a Rumanian capitulation had been carried on sporadically in various neutral capitals since 1943, generally in Maniu's name, and in some cases with the knowledge of Marshal Antonescu and his Foreign Minister Mihai An-

24. In 1944 there was a good deal of vague talk about their deeds of derring-do, but I could never obtain any specific examples.

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tonescu. These negotiations were not successful and were impeded principally by the Rumanians' understandable if unrealistic reluctance to face the fact that they must surrender to the Soviet Union and the Red Army. Their repeated requests for an Anglo-American landing in the Balkans or for some type of Western protection against the foe to the East had no possibility of success, given the strategic and political arrangements arrived at by the Big Three, and could only serve to intensify the suspicions of the Russians, who were in an increasingly powerful position as their forces drove westward into Europe. The coup finally came after a Soviet offensive broke the German lines in northern Moldavia in the summer of 1944. Following the coup a provisional government was formed under General Sanatescu; the four party chiefs were ministers but most of the cabinet posts went to army officers, in the expectation, apparently, that the first days of the government would be far more seriously threatened by conflict with the Germans than proved to be the case.

By the terms of the armistice signed in Moscow on September 12 Rumania was to join the Allies against Germany, supply twelve infantry divisions, intern German and Hungarian forces, and provide free passage for Soviet troops. It was obliged to face three economic obligations: provide for the Allied Command in Rumania, pay to the U.S.S.R. reparations of $300,000,000 over six years, and restore all loot taken by Rumanian troops from the Soviet Union during the war. The 1940 Soviet-Rumanian frontier was reestablished, but the Vienna Award giving northern Transylvania to Hungary was nullified. All persons arrested for favoring the United Nations or for racial reasons were to be released; war criminals were to be arrested; and fascist and Hitlerite formations disbanded. The application of the armistice was to be supervised by an Allied Control Commission operating under the Allied (Soviet) High Command. The term in parenthesis was clearly the ultimate authority

With the arrival of the Russians the Rumanian Communist party took on new life and a new leadership in Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnaraş, all of whom had learned their communism the hard way and had spent many years in the Soviet Union.[25] In Rumania as in the other eastern European states a distinction may be made between the purely local Communists, many of whose connections had been primarily with Western Communist parties, and the Moscow-trained group. The difference is somewhat difficult to define, since

25. In the beginning none of the three assumed official posts; Ana Pauker was occupied with high policy, Luca, among other things, edited the party organ *Scînteia* (*The Spark*), and Bodnaraş appears to have been busy preparing his armed squads.

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one case by a Soviet order, in the other by a strike of the printers' union. Tecahri Georgescu refused to take orders from Radescu and demanded that the officials in the Ministry of Interior pay no attention to the general.

The crisis reached a climax on February 24 when, at the conclusion of a large National Democratic Front demonstration, the crowd moved into the palace square and headed toward the Ministry of the Interior. Shots were fired, several people were killed, and that night in a rash—and final—broadcast General Radescu roundly abused the Communist leaders Pauker and Luca, and called on the army to stand by him.[29] Certainly Radescu was a greatly provoked man but owing his appointment to an agreement of the four parties he was not in a position to take an independent stand when this coalition broke down under the Communist attack. Moreover, by his rather intemperate language and appeal to the army he left himself open to damaging attacks from the National Democratic Front and the Russians.

The Soviet Union, in the person of Deputy Commissar Andrei Vyshinsky, now stepped in and demanded General Radescu's immediate resignation. After some hesitation King Michael agreed and started consultations for a new cabinet; again Vyshinsky intervened and demanded that a National Democratic Front government under Petru Groza be installed.[30] Meanwhile the Soviet command had taken the necessary precautions. There was at that time only one Rumanian force capable of resisting the National Democratic Front's armed formations—the army. The Russians ordered the Rumanian units stationed in and near Bucarest to be sent to the front, and the capital was denuded of troops. The following weekend witnessed another mass demonstration which was clearly in a position to take over the government forcibly if need be. In the midst of the demonstration it was announced that the king had accepted the Groza government. On March 6, 1945, it was installed, as a coalition of the groups making up the National Democratic Front, and also including an insignificant

29. This riot is to me a particularly discouraging example of the difficulty of writing history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. This incident, as it later proved, was the event which led to the overthrow of the Radescu government and the installation of the Groza cabinet. I had watched the procession and was in the crowd no more than fifty feet from the first shots. Yet at that time and since I have been unable to discover precisely what happened. I do know that the government had kept Rumanian troops off the street that day to avoid inciting trouble. The crowd did move toward the Ministry of the Interior building, although it showed little signs of direction. The first shots were fired from a small piece and from somewhere in the crowd, but by whom and for what purpose I do not know, although there has been no lack of stories and explanations.

30. An account of Vyshinsky's actions, taken from official American sources, is given in James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York; London, 1947), pp. 50-55.

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dissident National Peasant party and a Liberal fraction under the opportunist Gheorghe Tătărescu, whose government in 1936 had sentenced Ana Pauker to ten years' imprisonment.

Why did the Groza government come to power? This question is difficult to answer, even though many of the facts are reasonably well established, because it involves the intentions behind the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In the first place, the Groza regime was directly and positively installed by the Soviet Union, in an explicit manner by Vyshinsky, but even before that by the Soviet decision to break up the Radescu government through the National Democratic Front. Although there is no convincing evidence that the National Democratic Front possessed broad popular support, it was not without effective strength in Bucarest. Before it came to office it was able to assemble large crowds of demonstrators, which were really quite impressive despite the tendency of Tass and the Communist press greatly to inflate their numbers. Moreover, it had special squads of armed guards, which had obtained weapons in preparation for the August 23 coup and had subsequently refused to relinquish them, much to the dismay of the National Peasants and Liberals. Nevertheless, they could not have stood up against the Rumanian army had General Radescu been given the opportunity to employ it. In no sense, however, did the National Democratic Front represent the will of the people, although it must be said that at the time there was a general political vacuum in Rumania. It is doubtful whether the historical parties represented the will of the people except in the purely negative sense of being anti-Russian.

In the second place, the U.S.S.R. did not overthrow the Radescu government because the Rumanians were sabotaging the armistice agreement, or to guarantee the lines of communication to the Hungarian front, or because the Radescu government could not maintain order. If the latter was true it was because Radescu had been deprived of the means. This is not to say that the Rumanians of the historical parties were behaving in a manner satisfactory to the Russians. Hatred of Russia among these parties was bitter and profound. There was a constant hope that somehow the Western powers would come to their rescue. Well before the end of the war, and indeed immediately after the armistice, many nonfascist Rumanians expressed the belief that a conflict betwen the Soviet Union and the Western powers was the only hope for Rumania. Nor were the Rumanians altogether reasonable in their fulfillment of the armistice conditions. There were numerous cases where they tried to squirm out of a delivery by means of elaborate legal technicalities in a manner inevitably highly ex-

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asperating to the Soviet authorities. In a word, many Rumanians did not realize the implications of the new situation and were doing everything in their power to avoid the consequences of their military defeat. Undoubtedly this attitude was well known to the Russians; it would have been difficult to have missed it.

Nevertheless, as far as may be judged from the evidence available, conditions in Rumania and the behavior of non-Communist Rumanian politicians were not a primary factor in determining Russian action; Soviet initiative in installing the National Democratic Front government did not arise from Soviet-Rumanian relations but was an aspect of Soviet policy regarding the pattern of the postwar world and Russia's relations with the Western powers, Great Britain, and the United States. It might be well here to review briefly some of the information which has come to light on Rumania's place internationally in the last part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union was certainly interested in preserving its gains made in eastern Europe before Hitler's attack, and as early as 1941 was pressing the British and American governments, without success, for an agreement on postwar territorial boundaries. Soviet frontiers with Rumania were to be those of 1940, i.e., Bessarabia and northern Bucovina being reincorporated in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviet regime desired special facilities for bases in Rumania.[31] On April 2, 1944, however, as Soviet troops advanced into northern Rumania, Molotov gave a reassuring announcement: "The Soviet government declares that it does not pursue the aim of conquering any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania."

In May, 1944, the British government proposed to Russia a division of areas of predominant interest, whereby, "in the main, Rumanian affairs should be the concern of the Soviet Government and the Greek affairs the concern of United Kingdom. This British-Russian understanding would apply only to war conditions and would not affect the rights and responsibilities which each of the three great powers would have to exercise at the peace settlement." [32] On the condition that it be limited to three months' trial and definitely did not establish postwar spheres of influence, President Roosevelt gave

31. Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (2 vols., New York, 1948), II, 1167. In connection with the request for bases in Rumania, one might note that in 1943 the Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Maisky, stated that the U.S.S.R. probably would not oppose a Balkan federation, provided it excluded Rumania, another indication, perhaps, of a special status for Rumania in Soviet plans. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History* (New York, 1948), p. 714.

32. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 1451–1455. Roosevelt's approval was given without Hull's knowledge and against his wishes.

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175 charged with illegally distributing political leaflets; on May 6, 1948, Petrescu was arrested and kept in prison without trial.

661 On December 30, 1947, King Michael, an anomalous monarch in a universe of burgeoning people's democracies, was suddenly and rather unexpectedly forced to abdicate. At the time he said his abdication was voluntary but subsequently, after his departure from Rumania, announced that it had been made under duress and he could not regard it as binding. Government propaganda became increasingly unfriendly to the king and listed with great relish the castles, forest land, and industrial shares that reverted to the nation. Following the overthrow of the monarchy the government at once announced the creation of the Rumanian People's Republic (Republica Populară Română) and prepared the draft of a new constitution.

Having thus eliminated the monarchy and all overt political opposition, the Communists then turned to the task of removing disaffected or doubtful elements in their own ranks. In the autumn of 1947 Gheorghiu-Dej, commenting on the rapid growth of the Rumanian Communist party to 710,000 members, had criticized the "low political and ideological level of our cadres and the presence of chauvinism among party members." In the course of a three-day congress of Communists and Social Democrats, assembled in February, 1948, to ratify their unification in a United Workers party, Minister of the Interior Teohari Georgescu launched an attack on the Communist Minister of Justice Pătrășcanu, whom he charged with falling under bourgeois influence and overestimating the forces of the enemy, the Western powers. Pătrășcanu was removed from his post and from the Central Committee of the party; later reports have suggested his being a likely candidate for a purge trial such as the other people's democracies have enjoyed.

There had been friction between Pătrășcanu, a local Communist, and the "Muscovites," Pauker and Luca, since before the installation of the Groza regime. They found him too nationalistic and he was undoubtedly alarmed by the heavy, mechanically brutal tactics of the new order, its complete disregard of the nation's sensitivities, and its absolute subservience to Soviet state demands. Without question, many of the same elements which created Titoism and similar national heresies in the Communist camp were present in the Rumanian party, but because of the basic weakness of the Communist movement in Rumania and the ineluctable dependence upon the Soviet Union they never had a chance of obtaining control.

668 In February, 1948, the Communists concocted a new Democratic Popular Front, comprising the United Workers party; the Plough-

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men's Front, which had absorbed the dissident National Peasants to become a united peasant party; the National Popular party, which dissolved itself a year later on the grounds that the intellectuals and representatives of the middle class supporting this artificial organization should henceforth work within the cadres of the "mass parties"; and the Hungarian Popular party, controlled by the Communists but presumably designed to represent the Hungarian minority. On March 28 this bloc conducted and won elections, against a wholly spurious opposition, for a new assembly to vote on the constitution.

The Constitution of 1948 closely resembled the 1947 Constitution of the Bulgarian People's Republic and was clearly derived from and inspired by the Soviet Constitution of 1936. Apart from the fact that the latter is concerned with the union of a number of constituent republics, the principal differences reflect the transitional character of the so-called popular democracy. The People's Republic is defined as arising from the struggle against fascism, reaction, and imperialism rather than from the overthrow of landlords and capitalists. Private property is still recognized as one form of ownership of the means of production, though it is circumscribed by the "general interest" and subject to expropriation and nationalization. The Communist party does not have the preeminent status it enjoys in the U.S.S.R. As in the Soviet constitution stress is laid upon the right to work, to have leisure, and to receive an education; civil liberties, freedom of the press and of speech are guaranteed, but clearly for proletarian purposes; the right of association may not be directed against the democratic order established by the constitution. The supreme organ of the state is the unicameral Grand National Assembly, headed by a Presidium: the executive branch of the government is the Council of Ministers.[14]

Since the adoption of the constitution there have been few important structural changes in the government but rather a consolidation of the regime, the reorganization of the administration and the army (which apparently now exceeds treaty limits), and a running fight to eliminate the remnants of political opposition and to subdue sporadic uprisings brought about by the extensive new economic activities. A series of well-advertised public trials continued through 1948 and 1949, against Liberals, industrialists, military officers, students, Catholic and Uniate clergy, and Zionists, all categories that might cause the regime trouble or embarrassment. The new legal apparatus, including the addition of "people's assessors" to assure

14. For a recent study of constitutional developments within the Soviet sphere, see Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York, 1949).

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year plan for recovery, was inaugurated in 1949. It was to involve the expenditure of 82,000 million lei, including 7,000 million for the completion of work started in 1948, and was to achieve a 40 per cent increase in the level of production over 1948. The capital expenditure was to be invested, percentage-wise, as follows: mining and manufacturing, 47; transportation and roads, 21; agriculture, 9; housing and public services, 21; other, 2. Throughout the year the government issued reports of various portions of the plan being "fulfilled and over-fulfilled," but no absolute quantities were mentioned, only percentage gains over 1948, a singularly uninformative year. In the summer of 1949 the government announced that a budget surplus rendered available several billion additional lei which would be used to begin construction of the Danube–Black Sea Canal.[45] The plan for 1950 appears to be still a preliminary rather than a long-term development program.

Viewed abstractly, and hence, as all Leninists know, incompletely, Communism has three aspects which might commend it to the Rumanian situation: its emphasis upon the importance of industry, its equalitarianism, and its insistence that a backward society can make meaningful progress through its own efforts. Previous Rumanian political movements lacked one or more of these aspects. The Liberals and the neoliberals of the Carolist regime saw the desirability of industrialization, but it proved to be largely for the benefit of a narrow oligarchy. The National Peasants were far more democratic but they tended to be, if not hostile to industry, at least opposed to forced industrialization, which was probably the only way to bring industry to Rumania. Feeling that their country was too weak for such an effort, they turned to foreign capital for assistance, but their hopes for international economic progress "in the spirit of Geneva" were blighted by the depression. The Iron Guard had nothing to offer in this connection. The Social Democrats recognized the importance of industry as well as the necessity of achieving a truer democracy in Rumania, but they were unable to see how their socialist goals could be gained in Rumania with its peasant economy.

The Russian Bolsheviks under Lenin's influence achieved a remarkable tour de force in uniting these elements. They were aware

45. Along with the growing similarity of the Rumanian economy to that of the Soviet Union, there have been a number of reports of forced labor, primarily in connection with the Danube–Black Sea Canal. It may be relevant to note that by a law of January 21, 1939, the Carolist regime established an Administration for the Exploitation of Penal Labor; on May 31, 1945, the Groza regime transferred this administration from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Interior.

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of the political importance of the peasantry, but refused to accept the rural ideals of populism; they saw the need for industrialization but were not going to let industry fall into the hands of a capitalist oligarchy. Having achieved their revolution they set about to prove that it was possible to achieve socialism in one state, be it a backward state such as Russia. Whether this revolution and this socialism were what Karl Marx had in mind is a different matter.

The question remains, of course, whether the Bolshevik achievement was anything more than a tour de force. One can maintain that it succeeded simply because it has survived and expanded under exceptionally difficult circumstances. On the other hand, the shadow of repression which darkens the Soviet state, the heavy weight of a bureaucracy forming its own hierarchy, and the vast extension of forced labor, under whatever guise, would indicate that the Leninist synthesis did not reveal a magical solution for the economic problems of a backward state and that the Soviet Union has paid dearly for its ambition to build socialism in a single and relatively retarded country.

Aside from these problems of the Soviet economy, the installation of a Communist regime in Rumania involves additional difficulties. The mere fact that the Groza government was externally imposed has stigmatized it as an alien intruder. To say that this is of no moment except to the nationalist middle classes is but casuistry. It is significant that while one may find certain justifications for the Soviet action in Rumania—in the strategic importance of the area, in the pronounced hostility displayed by Rumanian regimes since 1917, in the advantages of coordinating the eastern European states in one large economic region—Soviet and Rumanian Communist apologists unfailingly fall back upon the one explanation which simply is not true, that the Groza government represents and is supported by the overwhelming majority of the Rumanian people. This does not mean that it will be vigorously and permanently resisted; alien domination is an old familiar in eastern Europe, and history tends to overlook the many cases when national independence, crushed to earth, remained there. But it does mean, for the near future at least, the blighting of whatever democratic tendencies may be contained in the theory of communism. Those Rumanian Communists who were known to have a Rumanian rather than a Soviet point of view were dropped from their posts and eliminated from the political scene well before the Titoist heresy became a public issue.

As to the economic prospects, there is, of course, the general advantage of participating in a large economic space. People of nearly all political outlooks have felt that the multitude of small states cre-

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ated in eastern Europe after the First World War did not represent a rational economic solution. The principal, and decisive, differences arose over the nature of the union or federation which should be inaugurated.

On the other hand, Rumania is now in the position of being a junior partner in a belt-tightening association. There is no question that in blatant contrast to the Soviet political aim of creating an eastern European coprosperity sphere, the actual Soviet activities, largely under the terms of the armistice, have thus far constituted a heavy drain on the Rumanian economy. There is no need to attribute malevolent intentions to this drain. The Russians were badly in need of supplies and equipment to restore their economy, and it is altogether natural that they should have accorded a higher priority to their needs than to Rumania's, and given the power relations they were perfectly able to do so. Unfortunately, this pressure in one form or another, most probably in relation to military requirements, may last for an indefinite period of time.

Ultimately, the development of the Rumanian Communist party and the fate of the People's Republic will depend upon the Soviet Union's relations with the Western powers. The Groza government was installed for reasons of international policy and its future rests with the fruits of that policy.

728 made, that "it is to be hoped that such exaggerated demands will be disallowed at the future Conference. The possession of Arad, with its poignant sentimental associations for the Magyar race, would be a permanent challenge to Hungary and would embitter tenfold her relations with Rumania, which must at the best be strained for many years to come." ("Rumania and the Great War," page 96.)

With regard to Bucovina, Rumania secured more advantageous frontiers than those the Allies had promised to concede her in 1916. She obtained the line of the river Dniester as her northern frontier.

The decision with regard to the Banat was not so favourable for Rumania, for the Yugoslavs insisted on incorporating the western part, which was peopled mainly by Serbs, and they protested against the allotment to another Power of a territory which stretched right up to their capital, Belgrade, and would have placed the latter under a permanent menace from another state. In consequence the experts of the Conference had to adjust the frontier as best they could, guided mainly by the principle of nationality. The arrangement is not particularly auspicious, as a small Yugoslav enclave cuts the railway line Temesvar (Temişoara)—Bazias, and leaves the latter town isolated from Rumania. The various nationalities inhabiting the Banat are, however, so intermingled that it was next to impossible to reach a more satisfactory solution.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

668 On Bratianu's[1] resignation, in consequence of the
648 presentation of an ultimatum by the Allies in October,
[728] 1919, King Ferdinand formed a Cabinet presided over by General Vaitoanu, with a mandate to call a general election.

A strong majority composed of heterogeneous left groups was returned, out of which a Cabinet presided over by Dr Vaida-Voevod was formed. He entered upon the difficult and ungrateful task of dispelling misunderstandings with the Entente and signing the Peace treaties. No sooner, however, had this been accomplished, than Dr Vaida-Voevod, while

1 [head of Rumanian delegation to the peace conference, acting prime minister, and leader of Liberal Party -- Analyst] 32

still abroad, was summarily dismissed. Peasant risings, a movement for autonomy in Transylvania, and general instability led to the nomination of General Averescu to office, owing to the reputation he enjoyed of being a strong man, having taken an active part in suppressing the peasant rising of 1907.

General Averescu's government passed the enactment dealing with the distribution of land to the peasants, while his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Take Jonescu, laid the foundation of the Little Entente by concluding alliances with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. General Averescu attempted to open pourparlers with Russia, so as to prepare the recognition of Rumania's right to Bessarabia, and there was a fair chance of his succeeding, but he was baulked of his aim, for the King vetoed his plan.

To M. Titulescu was assigned the task of reorganizing the country's finances. This was deemed to be an intrusion into the special domain of the Bratianus[1] and so by provoking their hostility, brought about Averescu's downfall. M. Take Jonescu was his successor, but he was able to maintain himself in office only for a month. A government constituted by the Bratianu party followed in January, 1922, and remained in power until March, 1926. Owing to the disunion among the Opposition groups the Bratianu party was allowed to carry into effect its nefarious project of securing complete control of the economic resources of Rumania. The whole legislation passed during its tenure of office was of a purely economic character, and under the pretext of consolidating the finances of the country they merely consolidated their own financial dominance.

Popular dissatisfaction was steadily growing in the meanwhile, as instead of relieving the money stringency, the economic policy of the government did nothing but intensify the evil from which the country was suffering. On the other hand the Opposition was closing its ranks and organizing mass demonstrations throughout the country. A monster meeting of peasants was held at Alba-Julia in May, 1925, followed up by vigorous onslaughts against the government. The latter, unable to obtain a foreign loan which would have enabled it to stabilize the currency and relieve

[1] [The Liberal Party, headed by John Bratianu—Ed.]

which is supported by the bulk of the party, may prove salutary for the country, as it is the only peaceful means by which a reversion to constitutional practice may be secured. A similar campaign has been launched by the Liberal or Bratianu party, for the elimination of the present régime, and it is possible that the force of circumstances may lead eventually to a close co-operation between these two political parties in order to attain this common object which at the present moment each is attempting to secure independently. That such a contingency is well within the domain of possibility, is clear owing to the widespread dislike and unpopularity the present régime is encountering, which is apparent from the persistent attacks it is subjected to by the Press; even independent newspapers like the "Lupta" and "Adeverul" joining in them. In fact nothing could better characterize the prevailing discontent than the following excerpts from articles published by the above mentioned newspapers on 17th May, 1932. "Whither this sort of government has brought us is made clear by a perusal of the newspapers published in all regions of the country. They show that the laws promulgated by the Government are either inapplicable or prove the source of new unforeseen confusions, explainable by the lack of forethought or the haste of those in authority. Their incompetence has undermined confidence amongst all classes of the population and has created a state of moral depression which shows itself in regrettable violent agrarian manifestations, in protests by members of the teaching profession and the frequent suicides committed all over the country, the majority of which are due to poverty.

The Government, which since its assumption of the reins of power has not even once had the moral courage to verify whether it enjoys the confidence of the nation or not, should comprehend from these manifestations that it has lost even the ultimate justification for continuing its activities, namely the hope of obtaining an amelioration of the present situation."

While the "Adeverul," commenting on the campaign launched by the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant Party affirms: "The echoes of discontent which

668 resound from the province across the Carpathians are not isolated. The whole country is agitated by this discontent which may explode at any moment."

The above statements should not be taken as outbursts of spite, for even in official publications, such as the bulletin of the Constantsa Chamber of Commerce, we come across similar pronouncements: "We are facing a complete economic disaster. All the productive forces of the country are exhausted. All private savings lent on credit are lost owing to general insolvency. The State is unable to collect even one fourth of the direct taxes it imposes. We have arrived at this state of affairs owing to the irrational financial policy of post-war governments . . . . . Great mistakes were committed, and this fact should be admitted before we start on the right path. Many of our rulers were incompetent and dissipated, not to say that they acted as profiteers." (February, 1932, p. 23–26.)

645 [652] Since proofs were submitted the following events have occurred in Rumania:

Owing to the growing discontent among public functionaries, pensioners and officers at their not receiving their pay, the King felt constrained to enjoin the Cabinet to satisfy forthwith the legitimate claims of these public servants. The government, unable to comply with this behest, tendered its resignation early in June, whereupon the King once more convoked M. Titulescu to Bucarest, and bade him form a coalition cabinet. M. Titulescu's efforts proved again fruitless; for while the National Peasant Party did not refuse its co-operation, the Liberal Party asked that it should be entrusted with a mandate to form a government, as it pretended to be strong and capable enough to deal singly with the situation.

666 As, however, no party possessed a majority in the Chamber, it was decided to dissolve it, and to appeal to the electorate. M. Vaida-Voevod, who is known to be strongly opposed to gerrymandering, and other electoral abuses in vogue in Rumania, formed a provisional government to supervise the elections. These were held in July, and the

[186] 665

Transylvania, so that by impoverishing us they may exploit and lord over us."

665 668

Both M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod are known for their moderation and circumspection and through the "Patria," the mouthpiece of the Transylvanian section of the party, they have endeavoured to impose silence on their more turbulent followers and on the advocates of militant methods. But if a new political combination is imposed on the country from above, it seems that their hands will be forced and a more combative attitude adopted, which may well be the signal for radical changes in Rumania. The Transylvanian peasantry is far from being prone to allow the Rumanian goverment to ride roughshod over its constitution, and the absence so far, of subversive movements in that province is solely due to the demureness and composure of M. M. Maniu and Vaida-Voevod and should not be taken as indicative of a peaceful disposition. On the contrary, the Press campaign of General Averescu against the present régime has been widely approved and the peasantry is openly expressing sympathy with him. He is in fact becoming a very popular figure. Owing to the severe crisis which the province is traversing, which is more acutely felt than in the old kingdom because from the cultural point of view it is several stages ahead of the latter, it would not require much effort to turn the brewing dissatisfaction into open revolt. Already the peasants are beginning to manifest their disapproval of M. Maniu's attitude, and are more and more insistently demanding that he should abandon his present seclusion and explain the reasons for the passivity he has so far shown. Apparently they believe that the time has come for more drastic methods. A speech from M. Maniu delivered in February, 1932, to a delegation of his party, which went to greet him at his country retreat at Badacin and ask him to resume his duties as leader of the party, is characteristic of the efforts he employs to assuage the militant ardour of his supporters. He refused to accept anew the leadership, and among other things he is reported to have declared: "To-day the nation is deprived of its constitutional rights; we are on the threshold of bankruptcy, both economic and moral; we see anarchy enthroned in men's souls and hatred fomented in the pro-

668 vinces, and in the murmur of this growing dissolution one
665 hardly hears the voice of the national conscience, one and undivided. The nation is in the midst of disquieting social and economic troubles, and is being conducted by inexperienced and unprepared men, deprived of intuition and without inspiration. In such solemn moments you ask for my guidance. I shall offer you none. You have both intelligence and conscience. I pray you to revere the memory of the sufferings which brought about the consummation of the national unity. I beg of you that momentary incitations should not be allowed to trouble the purity of your devotion to the ideal of the unity of our State. . . . Uphold the unity of the National Peasant Party because it is by its aid that we shall revert to a democratic and constitutional life and extricate the peasantry and the whole social structure from its present wretchedness. Do not forget that you have to fight for a policy of equity towards the provinces. . . . . We have the advantage of having a youthful king of our own generation. We have received him with justified enthusiasm, and we believe that thanks to the qualities with which he is endowed, he will respond to the people's heartfelt desire and lead it accordingly."

665 This policy of passivity, hitherto followed, seems to have reached its close, for all of a sudden on May 14th, 1932, the "Patria" published a vehement attack on the government which may be taken as the preliminary move in a systematic campaign aiming at its removal. This fulminating article created a sensation in Bucarest, and hopes were expressed that this rebellious attitude of the Transylvanian section of the National Peasant party would not meet with the approval of its partisans in the old kingdom, but fortunately for the Rumanian people these forebodings were soon dispelled when the Bucarest organ of the party, the "Dreptatea," announced that this campaign had the full support of the party behind it. A concise summary of the above mentioned article in the "Patria" is given below as it indicates very clearly not only the wrongs inflicted on Transylvania, but also that the patience of the people is at an end.

661 "Transylvania and the Banat have been reduced to the
668 state of colonies left to the discretion of illiterate exploiters.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Eighty-six per cent of the State revenue is being raised this year in our province. Transylvania forms one-third of the total territory of Rumania, and possesses only one-fifth of the total wealth of the country; how then can this imposition of 86% of the total burden of taxation on our province be justified? 661 668

This oligarchy at Bucarest constitutes a gigantic swindle which has transgressed all limits and which in any other civilized State would long since have been blown up from its very foundations, so that every trace of this moral ugliness which disgraces this country should be removed. We do not enjoy equality of treatment with other Rumanians, for we have been excluded from appointments in the army, the customs, the railways, the post, the administration and the magistrature. We are far from being autonomists, but we will ask whether under such circumstances it is possible to stem for long the claim for autonomy. In all corners of the country people begin to display restlessness. They demand that a campaign be opened not only against the government but also especially against the present régime which aims at despoiling the nation of its birth-rights. This campaign will soon begin and citizens will have the privilege of sacrificing themselves for the purpose of securing the return of a constitutional régime. It will be a campaign of extreme violence in the course of which nobody will be spared.

The present economic disaster which we are experiencing is to a great part due to the disorderly conduct of State affairs from which Rumanians of the provinces have been excluded. For decades the provinces have been subjected to a policy of pauperization and political serfdom. We raise a solemn protest and warning that the time is not distant when Rumanians of the provinces will no longer tolerate these adventurers and political mountebanks who treat the provinces as colonies fit only to be exploited." . . . . . .

This overt and frank criticism of Bucarest circles naturally excited a certain indignation in the Rumanian capital, yet independent papers like the " Adeverul " were courageous enough to express a certain sympathy. In its issue of 15th May, 1932, the latter journal regrettfully admitted " it is probable that this warning from across the Carpathians will 661

did little to foster their civic development at the time when Transylvania formed a part of their kingdom, and this has been most lucidly exposed by Dr Seton-Watson in his book, "Corruption and Reform in Hungary." Nevertheless, this intercourse, whatever its momentary drawbacks may have been in the past, has influenced very favourably the Rumanian element, a matter that would seem to confirm once more the theory of Professor Wm. McDougall that "the development of the group spirit in general and of national self-consciousness in particular is favoured by, and indeed dependent upon, conditions similar to those which develop the self-consciousness of individuals, by intuition, by conflict, by compulsion, and by co-operation." (V. "The Group Mind," page 165.)

In general, it may be admitted that the minorities have been more favoured by the Bucarest Government than the Rumanian majority of Transylvania, for the latter, except during the time the Maniu Government was in power, was always in the ranks of the Opposition, and as such it could not reckon on obtaining any bounties, while the support of the minorities was very often secured by the dispensation of various privileges. Even in the economic field the minorities could reckon on a certain financial support which Budapest generously granted to their industrial and banking firms, while corresponding Rumanian establishments in Transylvania were stinted of all help from Bucarest because it was the policy of the Bratianus to stifle every enterprise that had not come within the orbit of the Liberal party, and for this purpose they did not hesitate to employ the most unscrupulous methods.

The Magyar minority is undoubtedly better off than the Rumanians of Transylvania from many points of view, and this is the reason why all Magyar propositions for offering the Hungarian throne to King Carol II have not been viewed favourably at Bucarest. It is felt that the Rumanian population has not yet been able to rise overmuch, from both the cultural as well as the economic point of view, and that it is still dominated by the Magyars. It is felt also that a personal union with Hungary under the common sceptre of a Rumanian King would mean the consolidation of the

supremacy which the Magyar still retains, and such an eventuality is fraught with danger for the Rumanian element in general, as it would tend to recreate a state of affairs similar to that existing before the war. Hungarian advances purporting to bring about the realization of such an eventuality have so far been coldly received, even those made by Count Bethlen to King Carol in person at Temişoara have not evoked a hearty response among Rumanians, either of Transylvania or of the old kingdom. The Magyar preponderance in urban districts of Transylvania became evident by the criticism with which the alteration of the law concerning the election of advisers in the Chambers of Commerce was met in 1929, when all these posts became elective instead of being partially nominatival. It was then reported that in the town of Cluj the Rumanians could count on only 20% in the commercial, and on only 30% in the industrial section of the Chamber, and it was proclaimed that measures ought to be taken to remedy the position of inferiority in which the Rumanian element had been placed, all the more so, since in other commercial and industrial centres, the position of the Rumanians was even worse than at Cluj.

Concerning these reported pourparlers for a personal union between Hungary and Rumania, it may be of interest to record what a Hungarian paper, the " Friss Hirek," published at Cluj, had to say on the meeting which took place at Temişoara between Count Bethlen and King Carol in 1932. In its issue of May 8th, 1932, dilating on this interview it stated among other things :—

" The negotiations concerning the personal union met with complete success and were based on the granting of independence to Transylvania under the leadership of Prince Michael, whose seat would be at Cluj, common Ministers for Foreign Affairs, War, and Finance. These matters were definitely agreed to. King Carol was to take up his residence for six months at Budapest and for six months at Bucarest.

The independence of Transylvania satisfied Count Bethlen as it would solve the minority problem. Transylvanians would enjoy equal rights and the various denominations

563 668 would obtain equal grants, while officials would be nominated proportionately to the numbers of each nationality.

Count Bethlen, however, desired to justify the millions spent on the revisionist campaign and demanded the revision of frontiers, namely the retrocession of the Hungarian towns bordering on the frontier (Arad, Oradea-Mare, and Satu Mare). The advisers of King Carol considered that the present frontiers of Rumania were final, and in order that the idea of a personal union be rendered acceptable to the Rumanian people, all reference to a revision of frontiers should be dropped as it was sure to provoke a fiasco, all the more so since the Liberal party was known to be hostile to the idea of a personal union. The Rumanians would accept the scheme only in case Hungary agreed to recognize the actual frontiers without rectification and in exchange for the other concessions. It was on this point that the negotiations came to a standstill. Count Bethlen was bound by engagements towards the revisionist group. According to his conception, only Transylvania was to remain under Rumanian rule as a Duchy, while other parts were to revert to Hungary."

In conclusion the paper stated that "the interview left painful recollections with Count Bethlen who now talks of an alliance with Italy and Austria."

The Dobrudja.

563 166 657 647 If the state of the minorities in Transylvania may be stated to be relatively satisfactory, taking into consideration the general shortcomings of the Rumanian administrative system, it is to be regretted that as much cannot be said of the Dobrudja, where both the Turkish and Bulgarian minorities, living in compact masses, have well-founded grievances. One of the main causes of dissatisfaction has been the ill-considered plan of the Rumanian Government to colonize southern Dobrudja with Kutso-Vlachs from Macedonia. Without making any adequate preparations to provide these people with dwellings, food and clothing, it proceeded to billet them in the small cottages of the Bulgarian and Turkish farmers which were barely sufficient for their owners. The newcomers being destitute, had no alternative to that of

lei which was absorbed by Russia. Through the latter country an annual surplus of over a million tons of cereals was also marketed, as an excellent network of railway lines connected Odessa and the chief towns of Russia with Bessarabia. Further, under the Russian régime credit facilities were obtainable and a capital of some 10 million roubles or 10 milliard lei was at the disposal of the agriculturalists, while now it is reckoned that the Rumanian banks do not dispose of even 1½ milliard lei for this purpose, and in spite of the fact that the present requirements of the population are incomparably greater, since with the breaking up of the large estates, it was indispensable to provide the peasantry with funds wherewith they might buy implements and cattle for their farms.

It would appear that any civilized government, however vague its conception of its duty might be, would have proceeded to endow this province with a network of roads and railways to aid the population by thus facilitating the transport of its produce to the ports, since Odessa, the former outlet, is no longer available for this purpose. But strange to say, the Rumanian authorities have done nothing whatever; though even the construction of a few short connecting lines permitting a partial reorientation of the existing railway tracks and the construction of a grain elevator at the Danubian town of Reni would have gone a long way to relieve the strain. Even the deepening of the bed of the Pruth as far as Ungheni might have provided cheaper transport facilities to a large percentage of the available grain, which was often left to rot in the fields because overland transport charges, in the absence of roads, were found prohibitive.

Even out of mere solicitude for the safety of the State the Rumanian government ought to have provided means of communication whereby its army might in an emergency be concentrated on an ever-exposed frontier, in a region where a perpetual state of war exists. But even this weighty consideration has not sufficed to rouse the Bucarest Government from its self-complacency. There are, of course, persons who would explain the continual agitation brewing in Bessarabia and the predilection of its inhabitants for Russian rule by the assertion that these dunces of Moldovans (as the

668 Bessarabians are popularly called) forming the most back-
177 ward section of the Rumanian people are mentally incapable of appreciating at their true value all the qualities which the Rumanian administration exhibits in its conduct towards populations whose goodwill it has set out to win. For the organs of the Rumanian State are inspired by a high purpose, that of converting these Moldovans of Bessarabia into loyal Rumanians, by inculcating in them a consciousness of the collective national will. When they shall finally see eye to eye with the various cultural missionaries which Bucarest has so far dispatched for their edification, then at last will loyalty and love follow, for loyalty after all is but the consciousness of oneness, and it is this consciousness of oneness that the Bucarest "Kulturträger" are attempting to impress on the Bessarabians.

668 These altruistic efforts, however, seem unavailing, for in January, 1932, a pan-Bessarabian congress of all parties and creeds was held at Kichineff, and delegates resolved to create a united Bessarabian front so as to impose on the Government which had done nothing for this province since its union with Rumania, the taking of certain measures designed to ameliorate the situation. M. Batsaria, a veteran Rumanian journalist, commenting on this congress in the "Adeverul" stated that a member of the cabinet had confided to him that this discontent was not peculiar to Bessarabia, but existed in all the new provinces. An atmosphere, which was in no way favourable to the realization of a complete spiritual unity among the inhabitants of Great Rumania had been created. And so long as the legitimate rights of all were not respected, and their just grievances remained unredressed, so long would unity be unattained.

The Jews.

[162] The Jewish minority numbers some 800,000 souls (accord-
563 ing to Winckler's racial statistics, 778,094) who are mainly
641 concentrated in the urban districts of Bessarabia, Moldavia, Bucovina, and the province of Maramureş. As petty trading, commerce and, to a large extent, banking is in their hands, all the more important towns have a numerous Jewish element in their population. The manifest disinclination of the Rumanians for commerce has permitted the

000 letting in the flow of the great body of people to the offices of government.

642 668 But there are those of course who mistrust democracy and who would prefer to seek renovation by other methods. Corruption among the political parties in Serbia prepared the way to the dictatorship. A similar trend has been discernible lately in Rumania, and among the exponents of despotism we find university professors such as M. Paul Negulescu. In his "Treatise of Rumanian administrative law," the second volume of which appeared late in 1930, we read that "most of the politicians being incompetent, and occupying high posts thanks to party influence, sympathize with men of similar mentalities, and look askance at men of independent character. . . . By the intervention of politicians in the administration its personnel is demoralized, as also by the creation of sinecures for party friends." The author proceeds to demonstrate that the authority of the State is compromised by such habits and indicates as a remedy . . . . a Government appointed by the King and responsible solely to him.

Political corruption brings grist to the fascist mill, scandals and incompetence are adduced as justifying the adoption of another system of government. The following article, which appeared in the "Epoca" for Oct. 24th, 1930, a newspaper with conservative traditions, reveals how gravely the system of parliamentary government has been undermined by the dishonest practices of Rumanian politicians:—"The task of reconstruction was incontestably easier for Rumania than for other States. First, owing to the similarity of race, language and religion in the annexed provinces, and secondly, owing to the immense resources possessed by our country.

Thanks to odious and dishonest party politics we have lived through an era of continuous descent into wretchedness more and more acute. Every party that has acceded to office has left behind it an abyss of hopelessness and of ever increasing poverty, empty State coffers, and a growing disgust in the mind of the taxpayer. Political persons speculating on the naivity of the masses have accumulated colossal fortunes which have been placed in safety beyond the danger of possible judicial revisions. This country, blessed in all by the Lord, which ought to have been the most prosperous

corneer of Europe, has been allowed to become the prey of odious vvampires, who have sucked everything dry and have even robbed us of our hope of possible salvation. Nevertheless, Providence hath granted the return of our long expected King," etc. 642 668

One is justified in expressing doubts as to the expediency of applying fascist methods in Rumania as one fails to perceive the dominating personality who might control and direct such a policy; one may also ask, where are the indispensable coadjutors to be recruited from? It can hardly be said of King Carol that he has been able to live down his unfortunate reputation so as to assume with some hope of success such a formidable task. As for his likely collaborators who, presumedly, are to be selected from among the Rumanian ruling circles, one need only peruse the posthumous memoirs of the late Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, in order to be convinced of the utter abjectness of this class. M. Pamfil Seicaru, who may be likened to the late Henry Labouchere of "Truth" for his fearless criticisms, when writing on the boundless vista of putridity disclosed by this compilation, stigmatized in the "Cuvantul" of July 17th, 1927, in the following scathing terms the leading circles of his country:—"These memoirs form a vast archive concerning turpitudes of a whole ruling class . . . the majority of this class which remained in the territory occupied by the enemy openly practised with him . . . while those in Moldavia offered a spectacle of the most trying moral bankruptcy. A parliament of speculating fugitives revealing a criminal insensibility in face of the tragedy of a whole country; one cannot imagine a more sinister divorce between a ruling class and a nation in arms. . . . And who amongst them can indict the others for their subversion of the national ideal? Can the aristocratic fugitive fragment which took refuge in Moldavia or Russia claim to represent a higher standard of morality than the section which remained in the occupied territory meekly to serve the enemy? They both form two aspects of the same filth." 641 565 661

As recently as May 6th, 1932, Octavian Goga, an ex-Minister and presently in intimate relation with the King, who publicly brags of being the successor designate of Prof. 565 641

241 565 of the State. It is this utter lack of consideration for this hard-pressed mass of humanity that raises the indignation of the foreign observer against those who, through the cruel irony of fate, have been called upon to look after the destinies of this luckless people. The selfishness, incapacity, and corruption of which they have given proof can only be compared to that moral disintegration existing under the Tsarist régime, and one should not feel surprise if finally the same developments supervene. The rural population is absolutely sick of the present system and has lost all faith in its politicians.

[668] An important meeting was held early in 1932 at Focşani by fruit-growers and viticulturists, who may be considered to represent the more intelligent classes of the rural population, and the prevalent opinion expressed by the delegates was to the effect that no alleviation could be expected so long as the present system was maintained, and that Bolshevism held out better prospects. This did not cause any alarm, and passed almost unheeded, save for some mild criticism from one of the veterans of journalism in Rumania, M. Batsaria, who, in an article which appeared in the *Adeverul* on January 20th, 1932, admitted that this attitude was significant, yet opined that it was not aimed against the Crown, which at the time was being very roughly handled by General Averescu in the Press campaign the latter had just launched.

241 433 In spite of the culpable neglect with which agriculture has always been treated, the industry remains Rumania's mainstay and sole hope of survival. The whole social life of the country, even its future existence, depends on the normal development of agriculture, which provides not only the food, but also the raw materials for the more promising sections of the country's budding industries, and the means wherewith Rumania can pay for the indispensable articles she imports from abroad, as well as for the payment of interest on her public debt. It is a matter of grave concern, therefore, that the average yield of cereals per hectare should have steadily diminished in the last nine years and sunk below the pre-war average of 1,130 kg. per hectare. If nothing be done to remedy this evil Rumania,

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661 preferential legislation, the right to exploit natural resources under State control, could all be and were secured by Rumanian and foreign trusts for comparatively small sums. The mismanagement and appropriation of public money by government officials, including the court, had ruinous consequences for the population which knew about these things, but was unable to do anything about it. [651] Indirect taxation, heavier and more ingenious than anywhere else in Europe, provided an inexhaustible source of income for those in power. The 'aviation-stamp', for example, which had to be affixed on every bill, theatre- and cinema-ticket, etc., was supposed to secure a strong Rumanian Air Force. In fact Rumania possessed hardly any aircraft at all as the funds were misappropriated throughout.

648 661 THE ROYAL DICTATORSHIP. The instability of Rumania's economic and political life and her geographical position made the country extremely sensitive to any changes in Central Europe. Therefore the rise to power of the National Socialists in Germany, the risings of February and June 1934 in Austria and world reactions to these events had [668] immediate repercussions in Rumania. The Liberal Prime Minister Duca was assassinated in December 1933 by members of the Iron Guard. Tatarescu took over and decreed a state of siege, which has not been lifted since, ostensibly to repress and destroy the Iron Guard. In fact exactly the opposite course was adopted. The democratic forces which began to rally in order to fight Rumanian Fascism were persecuted by the government whilst the terrorists were allowed to continue their activities.

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The Iron Guard was originally part of the Moldavian and Bessarabian anti-Semitic movement led by Professor Cuza. Amongst his pupils was Codreanu who formed the 'Legion of the Archangel Michael', a terrorist organization modelled on the Fascist and Nazi pattern and supported by Germany and Italy. Codreanu began his political career with the assassination of the prefect of police of Jasi, the blackmail of Jews and the persecution of progressive organizations. His adherents were poor students of the type which in Germany formed the core of the Nazi movement, the lower clergy, army officers and civil servants. His anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik slogans sounded attractive to certain big business men, high army officers and the higher clergy who gave him their support. The king regarded the Iron Guard with favour, for it seemed an excellent weapon for weakening the country's democratic forces and preparing the way for his own, undisguised dictatorship. Accordingly the crimes of the Iron Guard were not punished and the activities of her adherents remained unchecked.

In order to exploit the international situation, which was only too favourable for dictatorship, Carol began with an intensive propaganda, taking the slogans of Fascism, National Socialism and the Iron Guard, and laying particular stress upon his desire to rule with the help of the young generation. The schools and universities were militarized and the defence of the country made one of the daily watchwords. By ruling with non-party cabinets and playing off one party against the other Carol undermined the strength of the Liberals and the adherents of Maniu and Mihalache. From both parties he

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643 found guilty in a libel action. The only immediate
[648] danger, the revisionist claims of Hungary and Bulgaria, was to be eliminated by an even friendlier attitude towards Italy and Germany, and Carol's tour of the European capitals, including London, was intended to reassure the democracies.

643 Beneath the surface, however, the struggle between the Iron Guard and Carol continued. While Carol was on his tour, Codreanu and thirteen of his legionaries were shot by their prison guards. The Minister of the Interior, Calinescu, a former member of the National Peasant Party, who succeeded to the premiership after Miron Cristea's death in March 1939, ordered further repressive measures and was himself assassinated by Iron Guardists in the autumn of the same year.

563 668 THE FIFTH COLUMN. Nazi Germany found an extremely fertile soil for its propaganda not only among the Rumanian Fascist parties and some generals and industrialists, but also amongst the many Germans living in Rumania. They were economically prosperous and the best treated of all minorities in Rumania. The most important communities were the settlements in Transylvania and in the Banat. At first Nazi propaganda was not very successful owing to the economically favourable position of these Germans and their comparatively strong religious feeling.[1] But as time went on it had great successes. Under the cloak of cultural associations Nazi cells were formed which soon spread into every German village. Unwilling Germans were

[1] The 'Saxons' are Protestants, the 'Aelpler', also in Transylvania, and the 'Schwaben' of the Banat Roman Catholics.

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forced into these organizations by social and economic pressure. Combatant units, armed and trained, consisted of youths who learned the Nazi doctrine in their schools. Financial assistance came from the German banks in Rumania: they supported the transactions of the 'Association for Export to Germany', which secured a virtual monopoly in the export trade of grain, cattle and pigs to Germany and Italy, as well as the hemp-growing scheme, which met with considerable success in the Banat.

Similarly the German papers published in Rumania soon passed under Nazi control. Their information was received from news agencies in Germany which also supplied them with commentaries and feature articles. Naturally the Rumanian Fascists were supported by the German-Rumanian Nazis who acted as go-betweens and agents of their masters in the Reich.[1]

The pro-Nazi Germans of Rumania who had always possessed good economic, industrial and financial connexions were able to render valuable assistance in the economic penetration of the country by German trusts. In 1933, for example, the fusion of several chemical firms in the Banat and in Wallachia brought them entirely under German control. That they produced semi-finished material for explosives enhanced their value. The iron and

[1] The outrages of the Iron Guard, such as the desecration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, destruction of Jewish shops, political murder and blackmail, were aided and abetted by the German Nazi agents. A series of fires and bomb-explosions in Timisoara in November 1938, as well as other terrorist acts, were committed by members of the Iron Guard jointly with some German youths who were known to the public but escaped punishment.

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steel works of Resita and Copsa Mica, with a capital of six million pounds sterling, and many other factories also passed under German control. In the fight against Franco-British and American capital in Rumania, Germany was favoured by the fact that 50% of Rumania's imports were German, and 36% of the country's exports went to Germany (1938). By 1940 the latter had reached about 70% of the total.

This underground activity of the German minority, combined with the pro-Fascist leanings of the majority of the ruling classes, who feared to lose their privileges and were only too glad to join in the Anti-Bolshevik[1] crusade, and the corruption reigning in the army and all branches of the government apparatus, sapped the strength of the country economically, politically and morally. It had become an easy prey for the imperialism of Hitler.

[1] Especially savage measures were taken against workers' and intellectuals' progressive organizations, which were made illegal and had to go underground. Their members, if caught, were court-martialled and imprisoned.

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6,250,000.[1] Greater Rumania had ceased to exist.

THE FLIGHT OF THE KING. The territorial losses and the disintegration of Greater Rumania were only the outward signs of internal decay. The vigour and strength of the people, however, were not yet broken. The cession of Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina aroused feelings which fortified the popular movement. Demonstrations were held in all the big Rumanian towns demanding the abdication of Carol and the creation of a truly democratic government. At the same time territorial concessions to Hungary were opposed; and when it became known that the Vienna Award was to be accepted, in spite of the vigorous protests of almost all well-known Rumanian statesmen, police and soldiers had to be employed against thousands of indignant demonstrators in order to maintain 'peace and order'.

Popular discontent and fury against the king were cleverly exploited by the Right Wing. The Iron Guard, whose opposition to his personal rule was well known, turned the popular feeling to good account. They were the loudest in demanding the abdication of Carol, but naturally not in order to enable the formation of a democratic regime. This

[1] The remaining territory covered an area of less than 80,000 square miles; the population had shrunk to about 14,000,000. Official Rumanian figures state that Rumania's population in 1942 was over 16,000,000, of which over 13,000,000 lived on the land (Wallachia, 6,200,000; Moldavia, 2,800,000; Bessarabia, 2,700,000; Bukovina, 800,000; Dobrudja (without Southern Dobrudja), 500,000; Rumanian Transylvania, 2,400,000; Banat, 1,000,000).

12: Kormos S-4, 5 (no date) 1944
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so-called national and revolutionary movement betrayed its German inspiration by supporting and approving the handing over of Transylvania to Hungary, but opposing the cession of Bessarabia to the U.S.S.R. 668

The king's Prime Minister, Gigurtu, resigned on 4 September and Carol summoned General Antonescu, who was at the time imprisoned in Bistrita, and charged him with the formation of a new government. This step was all the more remarkable as the German Minister at Bucarest had been able to communicate with Antonescu while he was in prison. Antonescu at once demanded Carol's abdication and obtained it after two days' continuous and heated discussions and negotiations. On 6 September Carol, accompanied by his mistress Mme Lupescu and his aide Udureanu, left Rumania. His son Michael succeeded for the second time to the unstable throne. 668 643

Carol's abdication was due to many different factors. The occupation of Bessarabia by the Red Army and the acceptance of the Vienna Award showed how brittle and hollow was his widespread kingdom. Everybody knew how great the king's share in the weakening of the country had been. The ten years of his reign had led to disastrous consequences. The will of the people, voiced for the first time for many years, had a decisive influence on the events leading to the abdication. Another important factor was Hitler's distrust for a man whose country he intended to take under complete domination. The king's renunciation of the British Guarantee was unable to win him Germany's confidence. Since Carol assumed the throne in 1930 643 668 648

643 he had played off one political party against the other in order to strengthen his position. In foreign politics he followed the same tactics. He ended by completely isolating Rumania internationally and undermining her internally.

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It may be said in extenuation of his inglorious behaviour, that the dismemberment of Greater Rumania was inevitable, once the whole balance of power had shifted against the Western Allies, whose settlement had created it. But it is at least equally tenable that a democratic and united Rumania, which had succeeded in winning the loyalty of any considerable elements among its minorities, might have held out against the cession of territory to Hungary, by obliging the Hungarians and Germans to use force to effect it at a time when Hitler was anxious to avoid war in the Danubian area. This might have rallied Rumania with Yugoslavia and Greece, who showed a more heroic spirit, to the Allies' camp. In fact, the king's policy only aggravated the internal situation and sharpened the conflict of parties.

642 **RUMANIA GOES TO WAR.** General I. Antonescu, having obtained Carol's abdication,[1] pronounced

661 himself 'Conducator', that is, 'Leader', and proclaimed the creation of the 'Legionary State'. His government was composed of generals, leaders of the Iron Guard and civil servants. Codreanu's successor, Horia Sima, became vice-premier and at once organized an unprecedented regime of terror throughout the whole of Rumania. His henchmen assassinated numerous prominent opponents of the Iron Guard. The looting of shops and the beating

[1] [Sept 6, 1940 -- Analyst]

and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Antonescu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu, Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu. He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

With the formation of the Groza government there came the first major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu, Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Rascanu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
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(as Stalin argued persuasively at Yalta) to deserve separate membership in the United Nations. The voice of the Ukraine is therefore heard at Flushing Meadows—and is not to be despised, even though it is the voice of Jacob rather than Esau, for usually it has been that of Mr. Manuilsky, one of the most experienced revolutionary debaters extant. The voice of the Rumanian People's Republic is not heard there and is not paid much if any attention anywhere.

Before long the question will come up whether Rumania deserves even the title of satellite. This might be settled by Moscow's decision to bring her into the Soviet Union as one of the constituent member republics. Until now an argument against this has probably been the hope that she might one day be elected to membership in the United Nations, in exchange for Moscow's acceptance of some Western-sponsored candidate like Ireland or Portugal. But meanwhile the orbit in which she moves has so much shrunk that she no longer shines even by reflected light, and the chance that she might be considered entitled to membership in any world assembly of independent nations has greatly diminished. Foreign newspaper men no longer are allowed to report directly on what is occurring in the country. If elements of national resistance still exist we hear little or nothing of their activities.

Bucharest might have hoped to claim glory as the capital of the Cominform, which she supposedly became when the organization moved out of Belgrade. Even this is denied her, for the Cominform no longer meets regularly, in Bucharest or anywhere else. Perhaps the Soviet leaders see no further value in the organization. Perhaps Stalin has made up his mind not to permit any alternate center of power, even minor, to the Kremlin. Some persons think that the Cominform was created originally in order to deal specifically with the Jugoslav situation, and having fulfilled this function, though far from successfully, is now retained simply as a paper organization for possible use some time in the future. Today its principal activity is as a printing press. To the extent that glory attaches to being a printing press Bucharest has it. The Cominform journal, *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, is printed there in some 15 languages.

The Cominform journal may even be written largely in Bucharest.

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advertise to the Rumanian masses, most of whom had never heard his name. On March 8, therefore, Groza was told to ask Stalin for northern Transylvania, and by return telegram he received it as a "present." The Nazis had not yet been expelled from Budapest, so there was nobody there for Moscow to take into account. The Western Allies were not consulted. As a matter of fact, they had no objection to the return of at least most of Transylvania to Rumania, but would have preferred that it be done after study as to whether or not there should be frontier rectifications in favor of Hungarian ethnic groups; and they certainly would have considered it more suitable that the transfer be made after agreement among the Allies rather than unilaterally by one of them.

The steps by which the Communist-dominated Rumanian Government became an absolute Communist dictatorship need not be detailed here.[3] In the beginning there certainly were some non-Communist elements which favored a clean sweep of the old order even though the representatives of the new order were Communists and protégés of the hated Russians. Seizure of the large properties still left in Rumania after the land reforms following the First World War was popular in principle. Rumanian régimes of the inter-war period had not been noted for efficiency or probity, and the Communists hastened to identify all Rumanian statesmen who held democratic beliefs and had a Western orientation with the "old gang" of profiteers and politicians who had mocked the Constitution in the dissolute days of King Carol and had ended by taking Rumania into the war as the ally of the Nazis. The fact that Maniu, the country's leading statesman, was famous for his incorruptibility and stubborn devotion to the Constitution did not deter Communist propaganda from picturing him also as a corrupt relic of the old dictatorial order. The Socialists were, of course, completely outbid by Communist promises of pie in the sky.

But although these tactics had some success at first the only one of them that was based on anything substantial, the gift of land to

[3] For a fuller outline of the postwar evolution in Rumania as well as other parts of Eastern Europe, and of relevant negotiations (if they can be called that) between the Soviets and the Western Powers, see Campbell, *op. cit.*, also volumes for 1947–48 and 1948–49 in the same series by the same author, and the volume for 1949 by Richard P. Stebbins.